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I. Introduction 
Helicopters can provide unique support for various kinds of public safety activities. 
Best practices from California and other states raise the specter of liability for public-
safety agencies do not use helicopter support. Yet most public safety agencies cannot 
afford them.4 Deploying helicopters to support multiple agencies on a shared basis 
would help fill the gap, as would overcoming a cultural bias in the pilot community 
against smaller helicopters.  
As in most areas of human endeavor, the law does not determine how helicopter 
technology can enhance public safety; imagination, creativity, entrepreneurship, and 
politically astute pragmatism are the engines of integrating technology with reality. The 
law, however, shapes the result by providing mechanisms for cooperation and, when it 
is well-conceived, incentives to use best available technology. This precept is true with 
                                                 
4  Some 18,000 state and local law enforcement agencies exist in the United States. Half employ ten or 
fewer sworn officers. United States Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Local Police, 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=71 (summarizing statistics). Communities with smaller 
populations obviously have less tax revenue to support any of their operations. 
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respect to helicopter support for public safety activities. The law offers structures for 
sharing expensive aviation assets, and it may provide incentives for using helicopters. 
Air-One Emergency Response Coalition, a volunteer organization that provides 
helicopter support for public safety agencies in northern Illinois and southern 
Wisconsin, represents an attractive model for making helicopter assets more widely 
available. It demonstrates what is possible when proponents of enhanced public safety 
are willing to consider new approaches, and when passionate, effective advocates 
educate the public and the public safety community.  
This article begins by explaining how helicopters aid tactical public-safety operations, 
including law enforcement, search and rescue, and disaster response management. It 
evaluates organizational alternatives for making helicopters available on a shared basis 
and suggests ways to lower perceived barriers—in Illinois and elsewhere. It concludes 
that sharing is possible almost anywhere, that smaller, cheaper, helicopters can do the 
job, and that flexibility is necessary to assure a continuing supply of pilots. 
The authors, two of whom are helicopter pilots, and one of whom is a Marine Corps 
reservist drilling with individuals trained in ground control of air assets, have had 
several discussions with the leadership of Air-One and have participated in Air-One 
tactical training missions. They have met or talked on the telephone with law 
enforcement and EMS personnel all over the country and with helicopter 
manufacturers, and have ridden on airborne patrol missions with the Los Angeles and 
the Fontana, California, police departments. 
II. Comparison of alternative means for managing public safety 
incidents  
 
Helicopters play a supporting role to ground resources.  Public Safety ground forces 
offer the advantage of physical proximity. Police personnel can effect physical restraint 
and apprehend suspects when they get close enough. They can immediately administer 
medical treatment to a victim of an accident, criminal attack, or natural disaster. 
Helicopters can do none of these things. 
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But ground forces have limited mobility. Police officers on foot may or may not be able 
to outrun a fleeing individual; they may lose sight of their target as the target runs 
around corners, jumps over fences, or hides behind walls or bushes.5 On foot, they 
cannot chase down vehicles.  
Ground vehicles offer the advantage of faster speeds, compared with personnel on foot, 
but they are seriously limited in their mobility, being confined to streets and alleys and 
able to operate off-road only in terrain relatively free of obstacles. Their visual field is 
only slightly better than personnel on foot. Pursuing fleeing vehicles creates risks to 
police officers and to the general public. 
Helicopters6 easily overcome these limitations. Helicopters can fly at 130 miles per hour 
over traffic jams, or they can fly slowly to keep pace with a suspect fleeing on foot. They 
can land and take off from any place slightly larger than the dimensions of the 
helicopter. Helicopters are, however, expensive.7  
Ultimately, drones may displace manned helicopters for some law enforcement patrol 
support because of their lower cost,8 but this is unlikely to happen any time soon.9 Use 
                                                 
5  See generally Jack H. Schonely, Apprehending Fleeting Suspects (2005) [hereinafter “Fleeing Suspects”]. 
6 Both fixed wing aircraft (airplanes) and helicopters can be invaluable adjuncts to ground-based public-
safety operations, but their characteristics make them useful for different purposes. Airplanes fly faster 
and are better for longer-range missions. Helicopters can fly slower, down to a speed of zero (a 
phenomenon known as “hovering"), and are better for missions that require staying close to a scene. 
Airplanes stay in the air because their wings generate lift proportional to their forward speed. Below of 
speed of about sixty-five miles per hour, an airplane wing “stalls.” When a wing stalls air stops flowing 
smoothly over it, and it no longer generates lift. A stall has nothing to do with the engine quitting. 
Helicopters depend, not on forward speed, but spinning of their rotors to generate lift. They thus can fly 
at any speed and hover (remain stationary while flying) as long as the engine is turning the rotor. 
7 Their operating costs are high. See § IV.A for a chart showing helicopter operating costs. Costs for fixed-
wing aircraft used in public safety missions range from $140-190 per hour. See 
https://www.conklindd.com/CDALibrary/ACCostSummary.aspx (table of values computed by 
commercial aircraft evaluation service). Fuel costs alone are $325-$965 per hour. Using the fuel 
consumption figures from the comparison chart in and a Jet A fuel price of $6.78. They have high 
acquisition and maintenance costs. The State of Ohio estimates the cost of a 100-hour inspection for an 
AS350 at $4,541, and the cost of a 500-hour inspection at $10,180. 
www.dot.state.oh.us/Divisions/ContractAdmin/Contracts/.../092-13a.xls. This represents an additional 
$65.77 per hour in direct operating costs. 
8 The general perception is that drones will be much cheaper to purchase and to operate than manned 
aircraft. Identifying credible prices is difficult, however, because the civilian drone industry is in its 




of law-enforcement drones raises vigorously debated questions about safety of flight,10 
privacy, and security.11  
Lower cost12 will always be offset by inherent limitations. For one thing, their safety and 
utility requires maintaining the integrity of a line-of-sight wireless link.13 It is one thing 
if the ground controller loses communication with a military drone flying well over 
contested enemy or ungoverned territory. The drone simply crashes, and property 
damage or injuries resulting from the crash can be chalked up to "collateral damage” in 
an armed conflict. 14 That would hardly be the case if a law-enforcement drone were 
                                                                                                                                                             
endurance times on the order of 30 minutes publishes prices from €20,000 to €40,000 for complete 
systems, including the ground control console. http://www.microdrones.com/purchase/purchase-a-
microdrone-platform-at-microdrones.php. A U.S.-based vendor of a roughly equivalent machine prices it 
at $1,200, but it aims at the hobbyist/consumer market. http://www.dji.com/product/phantom-2-vision/. 
Another U.S. vendor, aiming at the industrial market, belittles hobbyist competitors and quotes prices of 
$55,000 for a fixed-wing vehicle. http://www.falcon-uav.com/pricing/.  
Any estimate of operating cost would be entirely speculative, because too little is known about regulatory 
requirements, operator qualifications, and labor markets. 
9  See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (2012) (requiring FAA 
to speed up certification of drone use by law enforcement). The FAA released its first five-year unmanned 
aircraft systems (UAS) “roadmap”—a preliminary first step to regulatory action-- on 8 November 2013. 
Federal Aviation Administration, Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National 
Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap (1st ed. 2013), 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/UAS_Roadmap_2013.pdf See also Villansenor, 36 Harv. 
J. L. & Pub. Pol'y at 470-471 (reviewing FAA regulatory framework for drones). 
10  Villansenor, 36 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y at 473-475 (explaing unique safety concerns associated with 
drone operations). 
11  See John Villasenor, Observations From Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy, 36 Harv. J. L. & 
Pub. Pol'y 457 (2013) [hereinafter "Villasenor"] (predicting that drones will "dominate the future of 
aviation and analyzing safety and privacy issues"); id. at 461-468 (reviewing unmanned aircraft systems 
technology and its history) 
12  See Villansenor, 36 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y at 467 (claiming law enforcement drone operating costs of 
$25 per hour). It is too early to tell whether their acquisition cost will be lower. Section XXX discusses 
helicopter costs. 
13 See Micah Zenko, Ten Things You Didn't Know About Drones, Foreign Policy, item #2 (March/April 
2012), http://www.cfr.org/drones/ten-things-you-didnt-know-drones/p27497 (reporting that drones tend 
to crash frequently, often due to lost data links). “Line of sight” means that a drone’ radio antenna must 
be within a straight line from the ground station antenna. Over-the horizon communications is not 
possible. 
14 See Idyli Tsakiri Karatzaferi, Collateral damage caused by drones: Crime or accident? (Feb. 14, 2013), 
http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=215895 (quoting DOD official on collateral 
damage resulting from drone mishaps). 
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flying over a congested area of New York, Dallas, or Chicago when communication is 
lost. It is very difficult to assure 100% integrity of wireless links with moving aircraft. 15 
Moreover, maintaining traffic separation from other drones and from manned aircraft is 
a problem that has not been solved yet.  
Use of manned helicopters by public safety agencies is well accepted;16 public 
controversy and the difficulty of developing an appropriate regulatory framework for 
drones are likely to delay their widespread deployment in public-safety applications. 
Eventually, however, the FAA will permit drone operations from relatively low heights 
when they are kept within the view of the operator, and when line-of-sight radio 
communication is maintained. Under those restrictions, a ground-based law 
enforcement unit to which a skilled drone operator is attached could launch a rotary-
wing drone to operate in the immediate area of a barricade situation. Such a drone 
equipped with color and infrared imaging could search an area obscured by structures, 
foliage, or terrain, or hazardous for ground personnel to penetrate. But this is a far cry 
from drones’ flying patrol over a major part of Lake County Illinois17 or the northern 
half of Los Angeles.18 Drones are incapable of missions requiring insertion or extraction 
of personnel and cargo.  
For now, drones are irrelevant to most public safety missions, although this will change 
over the next five-to-ten years. 
                                                 
15 Anyone who flies electronic news gathering (“ENG”) helicopters can attest to that. Co-author Sprague 
regularly operates the camera and downlink equipment on EGN helicopters, and deals with lost links 
often. 
Radio control links can be made more robust. Communications designs used for space-system control can 
be adapted to drone control, although two major challenges would need to be addressed. First, the data 
rate required to control space systems is small, compared to data rate to transmit the necessary signals to 
control an aircraft – particularly a rotary wing aircraft.  The data rate for image transmission back to the 
control station is similar; it depends, not on whether the system is flying in space or the atmosphere, but 
rather on the desired image resolution and frame rate. The line of sight restriction for most aircraft 
communication is not a problem for spacecraft, because the line of sight is virtually infinite 
16  See Jay Stanley, We Already Have Police Helicopters, So What’s the Big Deal Over Drones?, 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-criminal-law-reform/we-already-have-police-
helicopters-so-whats-big-deal (explaining why drones raise more public policy concerns than law-
enforcement helicopters). 
17  Lake County comprises 1368 square miles. 
18  The city of Los Angeles comprises 503 square miles. 
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III. Mission profiles  
Three basic types of public safety activities can benefit from helicopter support: law 
enforcement, search-and-rescue, and disaster relief.19 Equipment and flight profiles 
differ according to the mission type, although some common themes exist. 
This section analyzes the most common types of public safety operations in which 
helicopter support may be useful. In each case, the analysis offers guidance on best 
practice and illustrates details of how helicopters can provide support. In all cases, air 
crew familiarity with ground features is essential. When advance planning for a specific 
mission is infeasible, the TFO20 and pilot use enroute time to familiarize themselves 
with street names and major features on the ground.21 Inbound aircrews can get much 
of the geographic information they need from listening carefully to tactical ground 
communications while they are inbound.22 
1. Law enforcement 
Law-enforcement missions comprise three broad types: patrol, incident response, and 
barricade situations. Only barricade- and some incident-response situations involve 
military-style hierarchical command-and-control.23 In most law-enforcement operations, 
the first responder unit is in charge. 
a) Patrol  
The best helicopter support for routine law-enforcement support is for the helicopter to 
be airborne and participating more or less as if it were a patrol car. This provides 
                                                 
19 Emergency medical services helicopter support is usually provided by non-governmental hospitals in 
cooperation with private contractors. See § V.B. 
20  As section XXX explains, virtually all missions require both a pilot and a Tactical Flight Officer 
(“TFO”). 
21  Means at 40, 55 (suggesting familiarity with street names before helicopter arrives on station). 
22  Schonely at 46. 
23 While the civilian public-safety context is significantly different from military contexts, what the Army 
and Marine Corps have learned can be given weight and adapted to certain civilian contexts. Good police 
officers work on their own or in pairs and must utilize a wider range of discretion than individual 
soldiers. See Kevin Means, Tactical Helicopter Missions: How to Fly Safe, Effective Airborne Law 
Enforcement Missions (2007) [hereinafter “Means”] (detailing various law enforcement operations, few of 
them depending on “incident commanders” and command posts). Some public safety missions, however, 
such as search and rescue, fire suppression, mass shooter incidents, and natural disaster relief do benefit 
from hierarchical organization. There, Army and Martine Corps doctrine can teach important lessons 
about effective deployment of civilian helicopters. 
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immediate availability to detect suspicious persons, to aid ground-based units in 
stopping and questioning them, or to catch someone who is fleeing from a crime just 
committed. When helicopters are not already in the air, utility of helicopter patrol 
support depends on readiness of the crew and the time it takes them to get the 
helicopter airborne.24 
Kevin Means25 articulates basic rules of thumb for helicopter patrol: 
• Don't hover; it impairs sightlines for TFO and pilot, makes the activities of the 
helicopter more obvious to subjects, and raises safety concerns 
• Fly at or above 500 feet AGL, and at speeds of 50 to 60 knots 
• Adjust orbits so that legs26 from which the subject is obscured by buildings or 
other obstacles are flown faster, maximizing dwell time on the legs from which 
the subject can be seen. 
• Set up orbits so that they have an appropriate horizontal offset: typically one- to 
one-and-a-half blocks. Appropriate offsets, combined with the right speed and 
altitude result in an ideal sight angle of about 60 degrees.27 
Actually flying airborne patrols in Los Angeles and Fontana, California, validates most 
of Means’ precepts, although it calls into question his more ambitious assertions about 
reliance on infrared imagery.28 
                                                 
24 On 20 December, 2013, co-author Perritt, Faulkner, and four other members of the Fontana, California, 
helicopter team, three flight officers and two pilots, were discussing the air support operation in the small 
suite of offices adjoining the hanger. A radio call came over the hailing channel requesting helicopter 
support for ground units responding to an armed robbery of a retail store. The R66 parked on the ramp 
had already been preflighted. The helicopter was in the air in less than six minutes, and over the scene in 
another five, beginning to orbit to gain an understanding of what kind of perimeter had been set up and 
to get a better description of the getaway car. 
25  Kevin Means, Tactical Helicopter Missions: How to Fly Safe, Effective Airborne Law Enforcement 
Missions (2007) [hereinafter “Means”]. 
26  The “leg” of an orbit is one side; e.g. the upwind side. 
27 Means also offers detailed protocols for effective helicopter use in vehicle chases, both high-speed and 
low-speed. See Means chap.7 (vehicle pursuits). 
28 On 19 December, 2013, co-author Perritt flew an airborne patrol in an LAPD AS350B2, equipped with a 




The Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) is an exemplar of using helicopters as 
airborne patrol cars. It has nineteen helicopters. 29 They serve as force multipliers.30 The 
LAPD has two helicopters in the air twenty hours a day, with one on standby for the 
remaining four hours: 4 AM to 8 AM. The aircrew, comprising a pilot and a TFO, 
monitors the citywide "K-9" frequency and the dispatch and car-to-car frequencies of 
each division31 it flies over. Calls for a burglary in progress, reports of shots fired, or any 
other kind of call that might be aided by helicopter support causes the aircrew to 
respond on its own initiative. In some cases, the dispatcher for a division relays a 
request for helicopter support; more often a patrolman in a ground unit simply says 
over his car-to-car frequency, "Airship, can you come and search some rooftops?” and 
gives the location. 32 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 PM with its pilot, TFO, and Perritt aboard. Monitoring both the city-wide “hailing” radio channel and 
discrete division frequencies as the helicopter flew across division boundaries,  
During the 19 December mission, the helicopter responded to a reported burglary in progress of an 
occupied house, assisted in setting up a perimeter, and searched the neighborhood. It assisted with a 
rooftop search in another part of the city. It flew the high part of a high-low mission over a barricaded 
suspect. It monitored traffic stops. 
On 20 December 2013, co-author Perritt flew a mission with the Fontana, CA Police Department, during 
which the helicopter searched for a vehicle fleeing the scene of an armed robbery, monitored ground 
officer safety during traffic stops and watched for suspicious activity by pedestrians and vehicles. 
29 14 Eurocopter AS350B2s and five Bell Jet Ranger B3s 
http://www.lapdonline.org/air_support_division/content_basic_view/1179 
30 LAPD has a total of 8,000 sworn officers: 17.1 per square-mile and 2.1 per thousand population. 
Chicago has 13,000 sworn officers: 57.3 per square mile and 4.6 per thousand population. New York has 
36,000: 118.8 per square mile and 4.3 per thousand population. In 2008, New York had 36,000 sworn 
officers, Chicago had 13,000, and LA had 8,000. DOJ 2008 Law Enforcement Census at p14 (Appendix 
Table 5). In 2008, the population of New York was 8.3 million, of LA 3.8 million, and Chicago 2.8 million. 
http://www.biggestuscities.com/2008. New York's area is 303 square miles, LA's is 469, and Chicago's is 
227. http://www.census.gov/statab/ccdb/cit1010r.txt 
31 An LAPD division is a geographic area that might be called a "precinct" in New York or Boston and 
"district" in Chicago. 
32 The Chicago Police Department follows the LA model but on a much smaller scale. – Chicago has only 
two helicopters. Chicago also does not have crews on duty 24 hours/7-days. It operates two shifts on 
weekdays, from 8 AM to 4 PM and 8 PM to 2 AM, and 8 PM to 2 AM on Saturday and Sundays. 
The goal is to have one of the helicopters in the air during peak prime activity. Six of Chicago's 25 police 




When a more serious crime requires support, another helicopter diverts from its usual 
patrol area, and the two helicopters fly a high/low pattern, both using searchlights if it 
is at night, one flying at 300 to 400 feet AGL, while the other flies at 1000 feet AGL.  
When not involved in a particular call, the helicopter crew decides, just like a ground 
patrol unit would, where it should patrol: “Let's see what's going on down Crenshaw," 
or "let's check out the projects." When the helicopter sees a traffic stop, it orbits to 
determine that the officer involved is not in jeopardy.  
Considerable detail can be observed from 400-500 feet above ground level. Even an 
untrained person would have no difficulty spotting anomalous behavior by vehicle or 
pedestrian. 
As the helicopter patrols, moving between particular missions, the pilot varies the 
helicopter’s height AGL and speed as necessary to enhance safety and mission 
effectiveness, typically flying faster at lower altitudes and increasing height when lower 
speeds are appropriate. 
Little hovering is necessary; as Means argues, orbiting enhances perception of ground-
based targets and reduces the likelihood that a structure or a terrain feature would 
obstruct visibility of a target33 
The Los Angeles and Fontana missions provided an opportunity to bracket the 
operating environment—Los Angeles is obviously much bigger than Fontana, and has a 
considerably larger air support operation. Los Angeles flies larger turbine helicopters; 
Fontana flies one of the smallest turbine helicopters and a piston-engine helicopter. 
Nevertheless, only modest differences between the Fontana mission and the LAPD 
mission were apparent. For example, the Fontana TFO's intimate familiarity with the 
local geography made reliance on the moving map displays less necessary. He almost 
never referred to it. Otherwise, the Fontana and LAPD missions were flown similarly, 
                                                                                                                                                             
crime areas, plugged into the frequencies that serve the relevant police districts. The Chicago Police 
Department groups its radio frequencies geographically, with two adjacent districts typically sharing the 
same frequencies and dispatcher. Conversation with SGT Fred Harnisch. 
33 As the sergeant in charge of the Chicago Police Department helicopters said, “We don’t need to hover. 
Everything is in the camera.”Conversation with Fred Harnisch. 
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with respect to the use of the onboard equipment, and the flight profiles of the 
helicopters. 
In neither city was formalized, military style, command-and-control necessary. Street 
officers, as they usually do, worked quickly as individuals, coordinating as necessary, 
without having to take the time to deploy command centers and designate incident 
commanders. Ground units on the scene and the helicopter aircrew communicated 
directly, understood each others’ needs and capabilities, and took appropriate action.  
The same technique worked well even when multiple ground units were on the scene—
as for the burglary situation in Los Angeles and for the robbery in Fontana. In all three, 
the helicopter crew assisted in coordinating their placement and activities quickly, 
efficiently, and without argument. By tradition, the first responding unit remained in 
charge of directing backup units. 
Philosophies also differ on mission altitudes. The LA Police Department prefers flying 
low: 500 feet AGL or lower. Chicago, Air-One, and San Diego prefer to fly higher: at 
least 1000 feet AGL for Chicago,34 and 600-1000 feet AGL for Air-One.35 The dominant 
considerations are greater exposure to ground fire and higher risks if an engine fails at 
lower altitudes, and generally better visibility and situational awareness at higher 
altitudes. With FLIR equipment and a skilled operator, heights of 700 AGL or greater 
and horizontal offsets of a mile or more still allow acquisition of very detailed images.36 
b) Barricaded subjects 
Situations in which the subject is stationary and has barricaded himself, as in an active 
shooter or hostage situation requires a higher degree of organization than patrol 
functions. A larger number of ground forces must be deployed effectively and 
                                                 
34  Harnish. 
35  AIR-ONE Emergency Response Coalition, Inc., PIC Transition Syllabus at pages 11-13 (Aug. 26, 2009, 
rev. Sept. 29, 2011) [hereinafter “PIC Syllabus”]. 600-1000 feet for FLIR searches for stationary objects, PIC 
Syllabus at 11; 500-600 feet for vehicle pursuits, PIC syllabus at 12; and 400-600 feet AGL for foot pursuits, 
PIC Syllabus at 13. 
36 Air-One directs certain lateral offsets and 40-60 knots orbit speed, and cautions against hovering. 1.5-2 
blocks offset for non-urgent calls and 0.75 to 1.5 blocks offset and “proportionate airspeed” for FLIR 
searches for stationary objects, PIC Syllabus at 11; lateral offset to the right or left of a vehicle being 
pursued and behind the vehicle at a speed matching the vehicle’s; the caveat “all turns to the left and no 
hovering unless necessary” is repeated for both vehicle and foot pursuits. PIC Syllabus at 12-13 
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helicopter operations must be integrated with the ground operation. It is here that 
effective command-and-control is important. 
Well defined perimeters are important in many law-enforcement-support operations, 
but especially in barricade situations.37 Perimeters limit the movement of fleeing 
suspects or vehicles; they provide a means for excluding civilians from areas of high 
risk where a shooter or bomber is located. Both ground forces and aircrews must 
understand the fundamentals of perimeter establishment and maintenance: solid facts 
must exist to place the suspect within the perimeter; it should be large enough to reflect 
the suspect’s speed and last-known direction of travel; it must be tight enough to 
exclude the possibility that the suspect crossed it without detection.38 Any perimeter 
should be defined by how far the subject could have travelled in the time elapsed since 
the last contact. Identifying the boundaries of an appropriate perimeter depends on 
someone--the incident commander if he has been identified and is functioning, or the 
TFO otherwise--thinking quickly to estimate reasonable speeds, to multiply them by 
time, and determine distance expressed in miles or blocks. Boundaries of the perimeter 
should be chosen, to the extent possible, to permit unobstructed lines of sight, either 
from the ground or from the air. Either air or ground personnel must be able to spot 
anyone attempting to cross it. 
Once the perimeter is established, the helicopter can search from house to house in the 
nearby neighborhood to ensure the perpetrator has not escaped and to view other 
possibile strategies for ingress, for the police, and egress for the perpetrator. Situational 
awareness in this regard is greater from the air than from the ground: the personnel in 
the helicopter easily see the big picture. 
c) Surveillance 
Surveillance, in comparison to search, comprises an activity once a target has been 
acquired: A lost or injured person, or criminal subject the authorities are trying to 
apprehend.39 The most appropriate flight profiles are whatever is necessary to keep the 
                                                 
37  Jack H. Schonely, Apprehending Fleeing Suspects: Suspect Tactics and Perimeter Containment (2005) 
[hereinafter “Schonely”] 
38  Schonely at 14-18. 
39  Surveillance also can refer to the monitoring of an area to detect suspicious activity. In this sense, it has 
the same meaning as patrol, considered in §III.1.a). 
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target in sight. If he is moving in a vehicle, the helicopter needs to keep pace, flying at 
the same speed as the vehicle. If he is still, as an injured person might be on the ground, 
or criminal suspect who has barricaded himself with or without hostages, the helicopter 
needs to be able to hover or fly in a tight circle to watch his movements. 
The Boston Marathon bombing increased interest in effective surveillance of high-risk 
events where large crowds assemble. Aerial surveillance has unique advantages for 
such missions. Overhead, observers can spot unusual movements of vehicles or 
individuals quickly—anything that does not match the prevailing flow of participants 
or audience, such as an attacker dropping a backpack and walking quickly away. 
The challenge, however, is where to look. Means enumerates a number of things to 
watch for in any surveillance or search for a criminal suspect:  
• A vehicle driving much slower (on an expressway) or much faster (on residential 
streets) than the rest of the traffic 
• A vehicle disregarding stop signs and traffic signals 
• A vehicle stopping occasionally midblock with no one getting out.40 
• He offers charts illustrating how far behind a target vehicle the helicopter should 
be flown, varying with vehicle speed, suggests flying an offset of about two 
blocks to the ride side of the target vehicle (on a helicopter flown from the right 
seat, and shows how to deal with situations in which the helicopter overruns the 
target vehicle or when it makes an abrupt turn.41 
d) Collecting evidence 
The fact that most public safety helicopters have sophisticated camera equipment 
means that they easily can record the images captured. This provides a potentially rich 
trove of evidence of criminal activity and police conduct.42 Things must be done, 
however, to make this evidence practically useful. First, well-understood chain of 
                                                 
40  Means at 47 (noting that aircrew should be especially alert when a vehicle stops in a dark area for no 
apparent reason). 
41  See e.g. Means at 101 (Figure 41) (suggesting a 270-degree turn to the left to permit the TFO to keep in 
sight a vehicle making a 90-degree right turn). Co-author Perritt’s flight with the Fontana Police 
Department validates this guidance. 
42  See Kosakoff v. City of San Diego, No. 08–CV–1819–IEG (NLS), 2010 WL 1759455 at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 
29, 2010) (referring to helicopter video as evidence of confrontation between police and decedent). 
15 
 
custody requirements43 must be satisfied. Second, the high definition images actually 
captured are far more useful than substantially compressed versions of the same 
imagery or only periodic frames. Yet the amount of data involved in a full-motion high-
definition video image is enormous, and if the public safety helicopter operation tries to 
save everything, any conceivable level of storage will soon be overwhelmed. 
Accordingly, some protocol is appropriate to decide what should be retained and what 
safely can be erased. 
2. Search and rescue 
Search and rescue missions can be divided into two types: those involving search only, 
and those involving rescue. Rescue operations may involve human-load operations,44 
considered in § III.4. 
Search, as contrasted with surveillance, is used in this analysis to refer to efforts to locate 
the subject before he has been sighted. Search over a large geographic area is often 
conducted according to a grid superimposed on a map. Systematic searching according 
to established protocols is more important than in law-enforcement support, because 
because SAR operations take more time than the typical law-enforcement incident, and 
because SAR traditionally employs more formal command and control. In other 
circumstances, however, it is more useful to search according to ground features. The 
particular search needs to be defined effectively.  For example, “Search Memorial Drive 
eastbound to the on ramp for I-95," or “Search from the fishhook bend in the Fox River 
just east of Wilmot to the large quarry south of Route 173.” 
Lower altitudes are more helpful for surveillance, while somewhat higher altitudes, 
around 2000 feet, may be more appropriate for search, because it enables the helicopter 
to see more territory. 
Containment is an important part of search strategy. It is the same idea as establishing a 
perimeter in searching for a fleeing felon: 
                                                 
43  CITE, summarizing the rules 
44 Also known as “long-line,” signifying that the human load is carried for a significant distance, and 
“short-line,” signifying that the human load is carried for only a short distance. The article uses the 
regulatory terms “load,” “external load,” “external human load.” 
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"For example, you might have two or three people positioned along on a long straight 
road. If the search subject crosses the road, they’ll spot him. Bridges, wide creeks and 
open fields often offer the same confinement ability with a minimum of manpower. By 
confining the search subject, even if you only have the manpower to confine them on 
one or two sides, you immediately limit the area which needs to be searched."45 
3. Natural disaster relief 
Helicopters are especially well-suited for providing natural disaster relief. Often, 
ground-based infrastructure, such as roads and airports, is destroyed. Helicopters are 
the only way to get supplies in quickly. Victims stranded by floodwaters or blizzards 
may not survive unless they get food and water without long delays. And, of course, in 
some cases, they need to be rescued, or they will perish. 
Intelligence collection also is crucial: locating victims, assessing damage, viable inroads, 
possible delays for relief, and other disaster management issues. 
Smaller helicopters with only basic equipment can be useful for intelligence collection 
in natural disasters; however, larger helicopters with more elaborate equipment are 
necessary for inserting relief supplies or for rescuing victims. 
4. Personnel insertion and extraction 
An occasional law enforcement mission, and many search and rescue missions, require 
helicopters to insert or extract personnel. The most straightforward way to do this is to 
land and have the personnel get on or off the helicopter. Many rescue situations provide 
no place to land, however, such as water and high-rise fire rescues. In these situations, 
there must be some way for the rescuers to exit the helicopter and descend to the 
ground or for victims or rescuers to be picked up off the ground by the helicopter, 
without landing.  
Classified as human external load operations ("HEL"), these operations require a high 
degree of aircrew training.46 Pilots must to be able to insert and to extract a load gently 
into or from a one-square-meter area on the ground and to hover and maintain altitude 
                                                 
45 Id. 
46 Co-authors Perritt and Cue flew on a training mission with Air-One on 20 November 2013, and rode as 
mock victims on the end of a 100-foot load line. They observed aircrew coordination. The maneuvers, 
when properly performed, are more gentle than one might expect. 
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precisely. A subcategory of external load operations, they operate under distinct FAA 
flight rules.47 
Many different equipment configurations exist for extraction, including baskets, 
stretchers, and various kinds of slings. Load lines can be fixed in length, ranging from 
50 to 150 feet, typically 100 feet. Or, they can be configured so that the load can be 
reeled into the helicopter while it is still in flight. The type of extraction equipment best 
for a particular mission depends on the condition of the person to be extracted.48 
The level of aircrew skill required for HEL is significant. The pilot must be able to 
control the helicopter precisely in order to avoid sudden pickups or hard setdowns that 
might injure the human load and maintain sufficient altitude to avoid smacking the 
load into trees or other obstacles on the ground. In most parts of an HEL operation, the 
pilot cannot see the load or the load line. A TFO riding in the back must lean out, often 
sitting on the skids and keep the load line and load always in sight. 
The TFO communicates with the pilot through the aircraft intercom, using precise 
terminology to direct the pilot, typically counting down before the execution of a 
command or until a maneuver should cease; e.g., "come up with the load slowly for 
five; 5-4-3-2-1," signifying that the pilot should begin a climb immediately and level off 
when the countdown ends.  
Personnel being inserted assist the TFO in the helicopter by giving hand and leg signals; 
e.g., a hand motion upward to signify that the helicopter should climb, a horizontal 
motion with the hand to signify that it should hover, and clicking heels together with 
legs extended to signify that the load is ten feet above the ground on a descent. The TFO 
                                                 
47  14 C.F.R. Pt 133. Part 133 does not, however, directly address operations or flight profiles for human 
loads. Accord Human Factors at 8 (noting that FAR Part 133 contains no explicit provisions relating to 
HEL operations and procedures). The FAA amended the FARs in 1999 to add provisions relating to 
external loads, but did not impose significantly different operating requirements. 64 Fed.Reg. 43016, 
43017 (no special procedures or piloting techniques required by 14 C.F.R. § 29.865(c)(5) or Id. § 133.45 for 
human external cargo as opposed to other external cargo). See also See FAA, proposed Rules, Rotorcraft 
Load Combination Safety Requirements, 63 Fed.Reg. 37746 (July 13, 1998) (reviewing history of HEL 
regulations and revising airworthiness rules for "Class D"--HEL--operations). 
48 See Randa L. Shehab et al, A Human Factors Perspective on Human External Loads, DOT/FSS/AM-
98/13 at 17 (May, 1998) [hereinafter "Human Factors"]. 
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in the helicopter watches the load and relays instructions to the pilot over the 
intercom.49 
A number of largely unavoidable hazards exist in HEL operations. A failure by the 
helicopter pilot to maneuver the helicopter precisely enough, or a failure by other crew 
members to pass signals quickly and unambiguously, may result in a collision between 
the human load and ground obstacles. The load line or the attachment points may break 
or disconnect. A slack load line may entangle the main or tail rotor. The engine on the 
helicopter may fail during pick up, transit, or set down. The flight regime for long line 
operations requires prolonged hovering and other maneuvers at relatively low 
altitudes.  At these altitudes and speeds, if the engine fails in a single-engine 
helicopter,50 the pilot needs to maneuver so as to set the load down gently and safely 
and then to enter an autorotation to land the helicopter safely. Even the most skilled 
                                                 
49 Human Factors at 17 (recommending passive device, maintianing upright posture, with separate 
spotter to monitor HEL). 
50 In a twin engine helicopter losing one engine, autorotation is not necessary. Rather, the helicopter could 
continue in a normal flight profile until it could safely release the load and land. Worst case, depending 
on gross weight and atmospheric conditions, the helicopter would enter a controlled descent, release the 
load and then land. In the worst case, the rate of descent would be in the low hundreds of feet per minute 
as compared with a thousand or more feet per minute in a single-engine helicopter with its engine out. 
The FARs require multi-engine helicopters for most civilian SAR missions. "The use of SAR modes in civil 
operations requires special airworthiness standards (special conditions) to ensure . . . a level of safety 
consistent with Category A and Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) . . . ." 77 Fed.Reg. 60883 (Oct. 5, 2012) 
(imposing autopilot requirements on EC225LP helicopters). 14 C.F.R. §  133.45(e)(1) prohibits Class D 
operations 14 C.F.R. Part 27 (for rotorcraft with gross weights less than 7,000 pounds) and 14 C.F.R. Part 
29 for "transport category rotorcraft" impose special airworthiness requirements for Class D operations. 
Part 27 allows only multiengine rotorcraft meeting the requirements of Appendix C to Part 127 to be type 
certified. 14 C.F.R. §  27.1(c). Appendix C incorporates Category A requirements. "Category A, with 
respect to transport category rotorcraft, means multiengine rotorcraft designed with engine and system 
isolation features specified in Part 29 and utilizing scheduled takeoff and landing operations under a 
critical engine failure concept which assures adequate designated surface area and adequate performance 
capability for continued safe flight in the event of engine failure." 14 C.F.R. §  1.1(2). 
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pilot would be hard pressed to do this without injury to the load or the crew, probably 
both.51 
Search and rescue missions involving HEL require not only higher level of proficiency; 
they also require a larger helicopter and larger team. The frequency of HEL operations 
is low for any particular agency. The best coverage for the range of public safety 
missions results from larger fleets of smaller helicopters, with smaller numbers of SAR 
helicopters available on a more-widely shared basis. 
5. Limitations on flight profiles 
For any of these mission types, helicopters have limitations. They are not likely to be 
helpful, for example, when activities of concern are certain to take place entirely inside 
structures, and thus are not visible from the air. Even if an incident begins inside a 
structure, however, the possibility always exists that a person of interest may exit the 
structure. It may be useful to have helicopter assets in the air to detect such an exit. 
It also is problematic for helicopters to hover 50-100 feet above the ground—a posture 
often seen in action movies and video games. In any helicopter operation, the most 
urgent emergency is an engine failure. Aircraft engines rarely fail in flight—when was 
the last time your automobile engine suddenly quit while you were driving on an 
expressway? When they do quit, the pilot must immediately establish an 
“autorotation,” a flight regime in which the rotor spins and continues to generate lift 
because it is being driven by an upflow of air as the helicopter descends rather than by 
                                                 
51 In a human external load operation, the pilot of a single-engine helicopter experiencing an engine 
failure would have little choice: he would have to establish an autorotation as soon as possible and then 
perform a two-stage flare maneuver. The pilot would immediately lower the collective to enter an 
autorotation. As the helicopter begins to descend, he would immediately enter a flare to slow down. At 
this point, the helicopter is travelling about 60 knots horizontally, and 20 knots vertically (1500-1800 feet 
per minute). As the helicopter decelerates and the load gets closer to the ground, he would flare more 
aggressively.   He must take into account the fact that the load will swing forward with more aggressive 
deceleration, increasing its distance from the helicopter as the line extends. He would hold the flair until 
he judged that the ground speed was low enough for the human load to tolerate touching the ground at 
that speed. He would release the load as soon as he judged that the load had reached the ground, and 
immediately drop the nose to pick up more air speed. He cannot drop the nose too aggressively or rotor 
RPM will decay so much that the rotor blades stall. He would then enter another flare to exchange the 
remaining airspeed for rotor RPM, and then use the remaining RPM to cushion his landing as much as 
possible. The best he could hope for would be a survivable crash for the aircrew and survivable impact 
between the load and the ground. 
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the engine. At heights of 500 feet or less above the ground, the pilot about 30 seconds to 
establish the autorotation, select a safe landing spot within a very small glide range, 
maneuver the helicopter to it, and to cushion the landing as best he can.  
Heights below 500 feet and speeds of less than 60 knots make it difficult for even the 
most skilled pilot to perform a successful rotation even if he practices them regularly. 
The challenge is complicated in urban areas, where landing spots free of powerlines, 
other obstacles, and people are few and far between.52 
These flight profile limitations, however, do not negate the fact that helicopters are 
extremely helpful in various helicopter support scenarios, and their inefficient use is 
evident across many spectrums. One law enforcement scenario where their capability 
was not fully utilized was in Watertown, Massachusetts.  
6. Watertown, MA: a case study 
Anyone who has seen the video of the apprehension of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev after the 
Boston Marathon attacks53 can appreciate how essential the Massachusetts State Police 
helicopter and its infrared imaging was in obtaining a successful outcome--without 
injury to law-enforcement personnel and with non-fatal injuries to the suspect. It is not 
clear why helicopters were not involved earlier in coordinating the law-enforcement 
response to the confrontation that occurred in Watertown after Dzhokhar and his 
brother Tamerlan killed an MIT policeman and carjacked a Mercedes-Benz SUV. Video 
and witness accounts used in reconstructing the scene afterwards show great 
confusion.54 Had a helicopter been involved in the law-enforcement response, Dzhokhar 
might not have escaped, and Tamerlan might not have been killed. In any event, the 
                                                 
52  See FAA, Helicopter Instructor’s Handbook figure 8-2 at p.8-4 (FAA-H-8083-4 2012) (showing 
hazardous area below 60 knots and 500 feet, determined by test pilot’s ability to establish autorotation); 
FAA Helicopter Flying Handbook figure 11-3 at p. 11-8  (FAA-H-8083-21A 2012) (same). 
53  See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YkzvMf3tigw (vid of boat taken from helicopter equipped with 
night-vision equipment). 
54  See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NI0F5rm37-w (showing video of Watertown confrontation); 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_pQXcqA6Ag (news broadcast about the confrontation). Even 
though the news footage in the YouTube video shows a helicopter in flight, the helicopter shot is in the 
daytime, while the Watertown confrontation occurred at night. 
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scene would have been illuminated by high-power helicopter-mounted searchlights 
and spotlights.55 
In considering the possibility of earlier helicopter support, one must make some 
assumptions about when a helicopter would have been available. The Massachusetts 
State Police has five turbine-powered helicopters, primarily twin-engine Eurocopter AS-
355Ns equipped with FLIR cameras, GPS synchronized mapping, interoperable 
communications equipment, and digital video downlink systems. The helicopters are 
based in Lawrence, Plymouth, and Westover.56 During the search for the Tsarnev 
brothers, it would have been reasonable to keep one or more of the helicopters airborne. 
If they were on the ground, ready to launch, one must make assumptions as to when 
they would have been called out. 
The murder of the MIT police officer might have triggered an opportunity for helicopter 
support, although the initial reports regarding the murder were quite confused. There 
was a crime scene to which the helicopter could have begun to lay out a pattern of 
surveillance. But it was not immediately clear that the Tsarnaev brothers were 
responsible. The initial carjacking of the Mercedes did not generate an opportunity for 
helicopter support because no one knew about it until the owner of the Mercedes 
escaped and called the police.  
After that, however, the need for helicopter support was obvious. The authorities had a 
precise description of the car, and they knew the precise location for beginning a search.  
The ground scene was chaotic. Watertown had only five or six officers on duty, so the 
Boston Police and the Massachusetts State Police took control of the search. “[A]ctually 
trying to get control of the number of people, the mass of people that showed up, 
proved to be a challenge for the people who were trying to organize that event." 57 
Law enforcement from outside of Watertown — about 2,000 altogether — had trouble 
navigating the neighborhood, a labyrinth of winding streets. They got lost. "They had 
                                                 
55   find video showing helicopter using high intensity spot and search lights and CITE 
56  State Police Airwing Section, http://www.mass.gov/eopss/home-sec-emerg-
resp/response/etrt/airwing.html 




no idea where Dexter or Laurel Ave was and they had trouble finding us,” Watertown 
Police Chief Ed Deveau said. 
The Lawrence airport is 19.4 nautical miles from Watertown. Assuming aircrew was at 
the Lawrence airport, and that the helicopter had been postflighted and was ready to 
go, it could have been overhead Watertown ten-to-fifteen minutes from being called 
out.58 If it were already airborne, as would have been reasonable in the aftermath of the 
bombing, it could have been there much more quickly. 
Even if there were no incident commander yet designated and no command post, the 
helicopter aircrew, using its FLIR camera, could have helped ground units navigate the 
dark streets through which Dzhokhar was fleeting.  
[insert map] 
The first contact with the brothers was when the carjack victim called 911—point A on 
the map. The first step for the helicopter aircrew would be to check nearby interchanges 
with limited access highways—if they were not already roadblocked. One familiar with 
the area would pinpoint the entry ramps to I-95 in Charlestown, and entry ramps to the 
Mass. Pike at Western Avenue. Quick dispatch of ground units to cover these escape 
chokepoints would relieve the helicopter of trying to monitor multiple exit points. Such 
assignment of ground units would depend on the availablility of realtime data about 
their location from software such as Spidertracks,59 integrated with the geospatial 
mapping software operating on the video displays in the helicopter. Map imagery 
available from software such as Churchill would facilitate identifying the likely exit 
points.  
Once the long-distance escape routes were identified and monitored, the outlines of a 
perimeter would be obvious, relieving the helicopter to search inside the perimeter. If 
that did not turn up anything, the subjects might be fleeing along other routes, or they 
might be hiding. That suggests, first, checking other likely exit routes, and, then, 
checking densely populated neighborhoods and areas of dense foliage that might 
conceal a vehicle.  
                                                 
58  It takes 14.5 minutes to fly 19.4 nautical miles at 80 knots. 
59  http://us.spidertracks.com/. 
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The helicopter would come inside the implied perimeter and work up and down with 
its FLIR system according to a grid, from the outside in. Additionally, the noise of the 
helicopter might have spooked the brothers, which would have aided the search. If the 
brothers were hiding and ran when they heard the helicopter, it would have made them 
easy to spot. If they were fleeing and sped up, it would have made them stand out as 
well. A car on a freeway travelling even 10 miles per hour faster than the other traffic is 
easy to distinguish.  
Once the shootout was over and only Dhzarnov was on the run, the same strategy 
would be adapted to this last point of contact—point B on the map.  
Thus, the use of helicopter support earlier in the Watertown case could have greatly 
assisted the ground patrol officers in capturing the Tsarnaev brothers.  
The potential for helicopter support of public safety operations, in Watertown-like 
scenarios and more broadly, depends on the particular resources available. That is the 
subject of the next Part. 
IV. Resource requirements 
A. Aircraft 
The types of helicopters involved in public safety support activities span a range from 
relatively small helicopters such as the Robinson  R44 to the UH-1 Huey. The following 
table provides a comparison of the most popular types. 












gal per hour 
 
Single engine:       
Robinson R44 $700-
900,00061 
1,000 113 $217 16  
AStar AS350B2 or B3 $2 2,270 133-155 $736 4862  
                                                 
60  https://www.conklindd.com/CDALibrary/ACCostSummary.aspx 
61 Robinson Helicopter Company price list, 
http://www.robinsonheli.com/price_lists_eocs/r44_police_pricelist.pdf 







1,519 135-155 $585 64  
Bell Long Ranger L4 $1.2 
million 
2,176 124-125 $722 40  
Twin engine:       
EC135/145 $3.9 
million 





165-167 $2167 142  
Bell 212 $3.7 
million# 
4,500 107-120 $1635 108  
• “fast cruise” and VNE 
• # Price for late model used; no longer sold new 
An unfortunate tendency exists for public safety agencies to convince themselves that 
they need larger and more complex helicopters than is actually the case. This drives up 
costs, complicates insurance coverage limitations, and makes it more difficult to recruit 
personnel. Two beliefs in this regard are worth evaluating.  
A deeply embedded belief in the law-enforcement pilot community holds that smaller 
helicopters do not have sufficient useful load for necessary equipment or necessary 
performance capabilities. A parallel belief is that nothing less than a turbine helicopter 
such as a Bell 407, an MD500, or an AS 350 is adequate for law-enforcement support.63 
Neither belief is valid. As airborne surveillance and navigation technologies and 
helicopter design have evolved, specialized police and ENG versions of the Robinson 
R44 and R66 helicopters have the same equipment and have essentially the same 
performance capabilities as those used by ENG operators and law enforcement agencies 
flying AS350s. The Textron-Bell Bell SLS model, expected to be certificated by the FAA 
in 2014, will provide another small-helicopter option.64 The SLS offers performance 
                                                 
63  Turbine power’s main advantages over reciprocating engine power are: greater power output for a 
given engine weight and considerably simpler machinery. 





comparable to the Robinson R66, and Bell expects to price it competitively with the 
R66.65 
The argument is not that the R44 or the R66 has the same capabilities as an AS350; they 
don’t. The chart shows that. Pilots with ENG experience in both prefer the AS350. The 
point is that the smaller helicopters have capabilities adequate for police operations, at 
much lower cost. 
Furthermore, empirical studies call into question the validity of the belief that piston 
engine helicopters are less reliable than turbine helicopters.66 
Co-author Perritt has flown with law-enforcement agencies flying AS350s and with 
agencies flying the Robinson R66. Flight crew activities, equipment, and flight profiles 
were identical, with the differences in aircraft making no material difference in mission 
performance. 
The acquisition and operating costs of the smaller helicopters are dramatically lower. 
Fontana acquired and maintains its fleet of three Robinson helicopters for less than the 
$3.8 million that the Ontario, CA, police department just paid to purchase one equipped 
AS 350B2. 
To support law enforcement patrol functions, the search part of search and rescue, and 
the surveillance part of disaster relief, a smaller helicopter such as the Robinson R44, 
Robinson R66, Bell 206B3, or its military equipment the OH 58, is suitable. For rescue, 
SWAT, and rescue operations, a larger helicopter is necessary, on the order of an AS350 
on the lower end, or a UH-1 Huey on the higher end.  
The higher costs of the larger helicopters means that their capability is more likely to be 
available through acquisition of government-surplus helicopters than by purchasing the 
open market.  
On the other hand, the capabilities provided by the smaller helicopters represents a 
more equal trade-off between market transactions and government donations, and 
between purchase of new and used aircraft. A Robinson R66 has a basic price of 
                                                 
65  Compare id. with http://www.robinsonheli.com/rhc_r66_turbine.html. 
66 Cite JPL study. 
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$800,000. Used Bell 206B3s in reasonably good condition can be obtained for $600-
$800,000. The operating costs and performance of the Bells are not as attractive as those 
of the Robinsons, so that the choice between them is basically a tossup. If an agency can 
get an OH-58 through the Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services program,67 
that would seem to be obviously preferable, but the costs associated with 
reconditioning a surplus helicopter and with getting parts for an older version can 
equalize the cost difference. Actual maintenance hours per flight hour are not likely to 
vary much with age because of the nearly universal requirement that parts be replaced 
as they reach service lives predefined by the manufacturer.68 
Load carrying capability is important for disaster relief, EMS, and search and rescue, 
depending on whether personnel extraction is likely to be part of a search and rescue 
mission. It may not be when ground personnel are nearby in land searches. Personnel 
extraction is central to EMS missions. Even if personal insertion or extraction is not part 
of a disaster relief mission, helicopters are likely to be called upon to drop relief 
supplies. On the other hand, load carrying capability is less important for law-
enforcement support and fire suppression missions-- of the wildfire context. 
Bigger helicopters have to be bigger than Jet Rangers, or MD500s; even AS350s have 
obvious size limitations on those kinds of missions. 
A belief also exists in some quarters that twin-engine helicopters are better. This is also 
questionable, except for HEL operations. 
In a twin-engine helicopter, the two engines are interconnected through a single 
gearbox and control mechanisms to drive a single main and tail rotor. Their 
interconnections are such that if one of engine fails, the pilot only notices a diminution 
in the amount of power (torque) available to drive the rotor. This is quite different from 
an engine failure in a single-engine helicopter, in which the pilot has no choice but to 
initiate autorotation and land wherever he can within a radius of about a mile 
(depending on altitude) within 60 seconds if the engine fails.  
                                                 
67  See § V.F (explaining source of Air-One helicopters). 
68  See e.g. 14 C.F.R. § 33.70 (requiring operating limitations for life limited engine parts). 
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Engine failures are quite rare, however. Safety can be improved more by having two 
crew members than by operating only twin-engine helicopters.69 
B. Equipment 
The equipment list for any particular helicopter should depend on the range of missions 
is intended to fly.  
Any conceivable public safety mission requires good geospatial mapping software and 
appropriate radio communications. Most law-enforcement missions also require a high-
intensity searchlight. Video and infrared imaging also enhances most missions. Search 
and rescue missions require some of the same equipment as law-enforcement support: 
good imaging capability and good geospatial referencing systems.  
1. VHF and UHF radios capable of communicating on public-safety-
agency frequencies 
Appropriate radio communication is essential for effective coordination of helicopter 
operations with ground forces and vehicles. There must be agreement at the outset of a 
mission as to what frequencies will be used for command-and-control and, when 
appropriate, for more direct communication with ground forces. Typically more than 
one frequency will be required.70 Frequencies must be available, not only in vehicles 
such a squad cars, they must be available on portable handsets, as well. Often, in a 
tactical operation, the most important coordination occurs between airborne assets and 
individual personnel on foot in the field. 
Air-One, like LAPD, the El Monte Police Department, and the Fontana Police 
Department, has the capability to operate on several hundred public safety frequencies. 
and the Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (“LEAS”)71 has worked with IEMA and 
local agencies to establish common frequencies for tactical communication involving 
resources from multiple agencies.72 IEMA has published an Illinois Tactical 
Interoperability Field Operations Guide (2012), which provides detailed lists of 
common frequencies, and establishes procedures for coordinating communications.73 
                                                 
69   10 December 2013 conversation between co-author Perritt and Kevin Sprague. 
70  See Tactical Primer at 49 (explaining need for tactical, command, and logistics radio channels). 
71  See 30 ILCS 105/6z-91 (establishing Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System fund) 
72   CITE 
73  See http://www.state.il.us/iema/SCIP/IIFOG-2012-corrected.pdf 
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The Illinois State Police maintains an emergency radio network for inter-agency law 
enforcement communication.74 
Everyone must use a common language to communicate with each other with respect to 
movements and location.75 
2. Geospatial mapping software 
As Jack Schonely puts it, “Always know where you are.” (And communicate it clearly 
to the air unit).76 A means for referencing places and objects on the ground is essential if 
air and ground assets are to complement each other. The SAR community has 
developed methods based on map grids77  
But for this to work effectively, ground units also must know their positions. Basic GPS 
capability is an efficient way to achieve this. Then, helicopter aircrew and ground forces 
can communicate by references to street names and compass directions.78 
Sophisticated proprietary hardware and software exists for public safety missions. It is 
increasingly questionable, however, as GPS-based products improve, whether systems 
costing in the hundreds of thousands of dollars are necessary. 
The Churchill 37 FLIR Star Safire product illustrates the high end of the market. It 
shows latitude, longitude, elevation and range at the top of the display screen, the exact 
address at which the camera is pointed at the bottom of the screen, and superimposes 
street names and numerical street addresses over the live full-screen image.79 The 
operator can select ground features to be displayed or suppressed, such as school and 
business names. The usual capability to zoom in and out is preserved, and the operator 
can trigger an inset with a zoomed image superimposed over a larger zoomed out 
image. A graphical image of the helicopter's heading and orientation and the camera 
                                                 
74  Illinois State Police Radio Network ("ISPERN"), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives-
mobile/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-8ff7-45100ca39f167dfe.html?ownapi=1. 
75  Tactical Primer at 45 (stressing essentiality of common terminology and procedures) 
76  Schonely at 42 
77  See § XXX. 
78   CITE 
79  http://www.churchillnavigation.com/media/vid/37-flir-star-safire. Camera azimuth and elevation are 
shown at the bottom of the screen. 
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elevation can be shown in a corner of the screen.80 The operator can enter an address on 
the touchscreen and cause the camera to slew to the targeted address.81  
Augmented Reality Mapping System ("ARS") gives the operator access to the physical 
camera mounted to the helicopter and a virtual camera linked to geospatial data. The 
operator can link the images generated by the two cameras, or he can select and zoom 
them independently.82  
At the low end of the market, commonly available aviation navigation systems costing a 
few hundred dollars or less superimpose maps, e.g. from Google maps, on aeronautical 
charts, and show the position of the aircraft on map displays as the helicopter moves 
around.83 A variety of grids exist for ground-based84 and aerial searches. ForeFlight,85 
the market leader in aviation cockpit navigation systems for iPads and other tablet 
computers, offers built-in search-and-rescue grids. It offers seven different search 
patterns86 that can be overlaid on regular aviation charts and ground maps.87 The 
Aerocomputer software on the LAPD helicopter causes the display to show the 
distance, the magnetic track to the target, the ETE, and the ETA. 
LAPD, Fontana, and Chicago personnel take their iPads with them and refer to 
geospatial software and images on the iPad as often as they do the more sophisticated 
Aerocomputers system installed on the helicopter.88  
                                                 
80  Id. 
81  http://www.churchillnavigation.com/media/vid/26-touchscreen-in-operation. 
82    See http://www.churchillnavigation.com/products/ars. 
83  See Pilot's Guide to ForeFlight Mobile, http://cloudfront.foreflight.com/pilots-guide-to-foreflight-
mobile-4.4.pdf, at 21 (showing how use can select street map or aviation chart for display). 
84 See http://kyem.ky.gov/teams/Documents/SAR%20Field%20Search%20Methods.pdf (Kentucky 
government document explaining grids, search methods, and terminology) [hereinafter “Kentucky 
Guide”]. 
85 www.foreflight.com. 





88  See, e.g. Aerocomputers' UC-5100 systems designed for law-enforcement, other public safety, and 
military applications. http://aerocomputers.com/products/ultichart/ 
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The TFO wore an iPad mini strapped to his thigh. He referred to GoogleMaps on it 
periodically. The TFOs said that they found Google maps easier to use than the 
Aerocomputer mapping software, although Aerocomputer’s computation of track to the 
target, ETA and ETE were occasionally useful. 
The need for sophisticated geospatial software and grid construction should not be 
exaggerated. In most cases, the following kind of exchange between your ground forces 
and aircrew is sufficient: 
"Where did you last see him?"89 
"He ran into the parking lot behind the Jack-in-the-Box  
 The pilot and TFO confer. The pilot slows to a hover briefly as they try to spot the Jack-in-the-
Box take-out restaurant. 
"We see it. We're checking the back."  
No special equipment preplanning is necessary; only commonsense identification of 
landmarks and an aircrew whose attention is directed outside the helicopter. 
On the other hand, moving map displays with street addresses is of considerable 
assistance in finding the location of an assignment initially. 
3. High intensity searchlight 
Helicopter law enforcement patrols depend on high intensity searchlights at night. 
NightSun90 is so common that it is used as a generic term. 
In the Fontana vehicle search, the helicopter first orbited in the vicinity of the holdup, 
looking for the car. Not finding it, the aircrew concluded that the car had gotten on the 
freeway. The helicopter then searched the nearby freeways, using visual inspection 
outside the aircraft, aided by the NightSun searchlight, and binoculars. The FLIR was 
on, but was not particularly useful, because what mattered was not heat signature but 
visual characteristics of the target. 
                                                 
89 This exchange is adapted from actual radio and intercom conversations during co-author Perritt’s 
helicopter patrol with LAPD. 
90 See http://www.spectrolab.com/searchlights/ 
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4. High-resolution color and infrared cameras, gimbled, and 
attached to the nose of the helicopter 
Most public-safety helicopters, like ENG helicopters, are equipped with sophisticated 
imaging systems comprising both color video and infrared capability. Such equipment 
is useful in a variety of missions, but it is not necessary all the time. 
The FLIR UltraMedia HD91 is an example of a system in common use for public safety 
and electronic-news-gathering helicopters.92 It permits an operator on the helicopter to 
zoom and pan the camera while watching the image captured by the camera on a high-
resolution video monitor.93 Typically, the TFO uses the monitor to examine detail not 
discernible to his naked eye, or to get the enhanced images available from infrared heat 
signatures of vehicles and individuals. Standard FLIR video displays allow split screen 
presentation, with a map on one side of the screen, and either the infrared or color 
video image on the other. Alternatively, the infrared image can appear on one side and 
the color video image on the other. 
Disagreement exists on how much airborne patrol TFOs should rely on imagery 
technology as compared with looking out the window.94 Means overemphasizes use of 
infrared imaging, however, and underrates the value of unaided visual reference 
                                                 
91  The FLIR UltraMedia HD is an imaging gyrostabilizer that houses a Sony 1500 digital camera system 
capable of a 1040mm zoom. 
92  The photographic equipment in public safety helicopters is quite similar to that installed in ENG 
Helicopters, with two significant differences: newsgatherers are less likely to be interested in infrared 
images, while law-enforcement is likely to find infrared imagery more useful than color images in many 
cases; pristine image quality is important for newsgathering, so it can be broadcast with the same 
aesthetic levels as viewers are accustomed to in the regular programming; that level of quality is less 
important for public safety operations. What matters for public safety operations is resolution and level of 
detail, not so much lighting and color balance. Conversation with Erich Schmid, 10 November 2013. 
93 When ground commanders want to see live imagery, an appropriate microwave link must be 
established from the helicopter to the ground. To enable this, the helicopter this must be equipped with 
an appropriate antenna system capable of locking onto a downlink frequency and automatically tracking 
the ground station antenna regardless of helicopter position or orientation. The Troll Skylink HD system 
is an example of what is available. See http://www.trollsystems.com/index.php/antenna-design-
2/airborne-antennas/skylink-hd-directional-antennas. Although ENG almost always involves downlink, 
it is rarely used in law-enforcement, even when the helicopter is equipped with the capability. 
94 Among other things, the temperatures in San Diego make FLIR more useful, because hotter objects like 
human beings stand out more clearly from the background. This is less true when ambient temperatures 
are higher, as in Los Angeles. Discussion with LAPD pilot and TFO, 29 Dec. 2013. 
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outside, searchlights for night operations, and low flight heights—on the order of 300-
500 feet AGL. The airborne patrol missions in Los Angeles and Fontana showed the 
superiority of outside observation with the naked eye instead of relegating the aircrew 
to being mere camera operators.  
What was important in both the LAPD and Fontana missions was skilled human 
observation of the ground with the naked eye aided occasionally by binoculars and 
searchlight. The FLIR added nothing. For most of the LAPD flight, the TFO monitored 
the moving map display, into which he easily entered a particular address.  
Infrared imagery was used more as a backup than for primary reference. It was 
obvious, flying in the LAPD and Fontana patrol helicopters, that inspection with the 
unaided eye out the TFO’s side window95 was superior to the perspective available if 
the TFO had fixed his attention only on the display. 
As in the LAPD operation’s roof inspection, there was no need for infrared imagery; it 
was obvious from the search-light illuminated roof in LA whether anyone was on the 
roofs that were inspected, and the SUV was obvious in traffic, with or without the 
searchlight.  
C. Personnel 
All public safety support operations require at least two skilled members in the aircrew: 
a pilot, and a Tactical Flight Officer (“TFO”). The pilot’s job is to fly the helicopter 
safely; this preempts any other duties he may undertake to support the mission. He 
must be capable of understanding instructions provided to him by the TFO and 
translating them promptly into flight maneuvers, while at the same time exercising 
judgment as to when a request would be unsafe to execute. 
The TFO must understand the capabilities and limitations of the helicopter so that he 
does not give instructions to the pilot that would result in unsafe operations. 
1. Aircrew 
The minimum aircrew comprises a pilot and a TFO. The pilot flies the helicopter; he 
must be able to go where he is told by the TFO and incident commanders and to fly 
                                                 




flight profiles that will be effective in accomplishing a particular task. In doing these 
things, he must be able to exercise judgment as to what is safe and what is not. He must 
be attentive to his altitude, airspeed, and rotor RPM. He must look out for other traffic, 
likely to be a particular problem because public safety incidents requiring helicopter 
support are also likely to draw ENG helicopters. The pilot also is responsible for 
communicating with FAA air traffic control, which may be more or less burdensome 
depending on whether the mission takes the helicopter into congested and controlled 
airspace. 
The pilot is going to be busy enough with these essential tasks that distractions by what 
is happening on the ground, where the camera is pointed, and communications with 
ground personnel would crowd his bandwidth. 
That's why the TFO is essential as a second crewmember;  observes the ground, cross 
checks the moving map display, handles radio calls with ground units and suggests 
directions of flight to the pilot. He is primarily responsible for operating the camera and 
the searchlight. There is no question that having street-cop skills in the cockpit is 
necessary to do the job well. Geographic knowledge of the patrol area, knowledge of 
what constitutes suspicious activity, experience with how someone might flee or hide, 
and the likely behavior of responding officers is essential. 
For the most part, the TFO makes the decision about where to go, but sometimes the 
pilot says, "Do you think we ought to go check that out?" He and the pilot communicate 
over the aircraft intercom and do not need many words to fly the mission in the right 
way. Both are likely to have access to the same moving map display, either on separate 
video displays or one they both can see. The TFO may say, "they want us to leave Sector 
A and go over head the southwest corner of sector B," or, "they want us to orbit the 
McDonald's,” or, " fly a heading of 300° and drop-down a hundred feet." Intercrew 
communications in Los Angeles and Fontana were succinct. As with any two-member 
aircraft crew, the two members assisted each other in targets on the ground: "see that 
high school football field. It's just to the north and a bit west of that, the house with the 
solar cells on the roof in the swimming pool of the backyard." “Slow down at this off 
ramp." “Right pedal,” from the TFO when he wanted the Helicopters slewed so that he 
could get a better view out the side window with binoculars. Once or twice, "can you 
come down a little bit?" when the TFO needed a closer view available from the lower 
height. In general, throughout this part of the mission, the helicopter remained at 500 to 
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600 feet AGL at a speed matching that of the traffic on the freeway. At one point, the 
pilot told the TFO that he was climbing a few hundred feet to remain well above some 
electric transmission line towers that were hard to see in the dark. 
The distinction between the roles of pilot and TFO does not mean, however, that they 
do not constantly back each other up; the TFO is constantly helping with navigation 
anyway. He must be aware of the basic capabilities and limitations of the helicopter. He 
should supplement the pilot’s lookout for other traffic. Similarly, the pilot must 
understand the mission tasks and be able to make competent suggestions about where 
and how to fly best to support them. 
A larger crew is necessary for load operations, especially those involving personnel 
insertion or extraction. Pilots must be able to fly precise altitudes and speeds and 
control the helicopter so that the load does not swing. The pilot also must be able to 
follow intercom instructions immediately and precisely. Especially in a single-engine 
helicopter, the pilot must have a strategy for managing the extremely demanding 
situation that would result from an engine failure. 
TFOs for load operations also must have carefully honed and frequently practiced skill 
sets, involving monitoring the load, immediately translating their observations into 
commands to the pilot giving interpreting hand signals, and securing load lines, tethers, 
and personnel vests securely. 
Other crew members for load operations include a copilot to reduce pilot workload and 
additional crewmembers in the back to monitor the load and relay signals to the 
through the crew chief or directly to the pilot. Rescue personnel, who may themselves 
become human loads, also may be necessary. 
Recruitment and training of pilots and TFOs are considered in § ___. 
2. Training of TFOs and ground personnel 
Public safety agencies must have an appreciation of when and how helicopter assets can 
be helpful. Air-One’s current training program96  is a good model.  
                                                 
96  Co-authors Perritt and Cue participated in TFO and GSO training on 20 November 2013, involving 




Participants in the Air-One training session included some 25 officers from northern 
Illinois police departments, including several from NIPAS and its Emergency Services 
Team and Mobile Field Force,97 and the Illinois State Police. A representative from the 
FBI also participated. 
The training session began with a two-hour PowerPoint presentation covering basic 
helicopter operations, helicopter safety and survival98 and: 
• Tactical team mobilization 
• Insertion of personnel through hover step-off, hoist, rapeling, and spy rigging.99 
• Rapid extraction of injured persons 
• Tactical emergency medical operations 
• Unstable platform sniper 
• Logistical support via cargo haul 
• FLIR and Night Sun 
• K-9 support100 
Safety was emphasized as the paramount value. Air-One never launches without the 
final signoff by its Safety Officer. 
The session included an overview of procedures for mission coordination, including 
availability of suitable electronic or paper maps, communications plans and 
frequencies, designation of one mission coordinator for ground forces.  
                                                                                                                                                             
in an indoor training activity on 10 December. 2013. The details presented in this subsection are based on 
that participation. 
97  See § V.C 
98  The presentation included guidance on how on-board personnel can position themselves to minimize 
injury in the event of a crash resulting from an engine failure or loss of tail rotor control. The presenters 
noted that, although two Air-One Huey helicopters are equipped for long line operations, the 
organization prefers its twin-engine UH-1N to its single-engine UH-1V helicopter for human-external 
load operations and training. 
99  The FBI cautioned against use of or training on fast-rope operations, because of its risks. Long-line and 
short-line human-load operations can meet almost all of the needs addressed by fast-rope operations at 
less risk. 
100  A number of K-9 dogs have flown in Air-One training missions. They usually exited the helicopter 
with their tails wagging. Careful preparation is necessary, however, to prepare the dogs for the noise and 
movement of the helicopter. 
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The training included basic practical tips such as “avoid the tail rotor,” and “don’t shoot 
through the rotor discs,” and reviewed common errors such as tensing up when the 
helicopter banks thereby increasing the risk of sliding free of restraints and falling out 
of the helicopter, losing situational awareness and thus knowledge of where a victim is 
when the helicopter lands, and various sources of distraction such as the “the lights and 
siren are so cool!” syndrome, remembered by every law enforcement officer from the 
first time he participated in an emergency response in a squad car. 
Static drills in the Air-One helicopters followed, with the officers armed and dressed in 
their tactical gear. The purpose of the exercises was to build muscle memory on basic 
procedures and to make safety and effective deployment instinctive. 
Although this particular training activity obviously was aimed at larger scale 
operations, its basic coverage of helicopter safety and capabilities and coordination 
between ground personnel and aircrews is appropriate for a broad spectrum of public 
safety personnel. Two components of a training initiative are appropriate, one aimed at 
current personnel, the other aimed at new officers. A similar training segment also 
should be added to police academy curricula so that all law-enforcement officers 
appreciate how helicopters complement conventional forces in various kinds of tactical 
situations. 
The theme of the article is that helicopter support for public safety operations can be 
available more widely if mechanisms exist for sharing. That is true of aircraft, 
equipment installed on them, personnel, and training. The next Part considers 
organizations structures the law makes available for sharing. 
V. Organizational alternatives  
The thesis of this article is that more communities could benefit from helicopter support 
of public safety operations if helicopters were shared among multiple agencies. A 
variety of ways exist to accomplish such sharing. One agency may own air assets and 
enter into agreements with other agencies; multiple agencies may contract with a single 
private operator; a separate organization like Air-One can be established as a kind of 
mutual aid pact. Or, the Civil Air Patrol can be adapted to cover all or part of the need. 
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A. Owning and contracting 
Public safety agencies can get access to helicopter support in four basic ways: they can 
buy101 one or more new helicopters; they can buy one or more used helicopters; they can 
obtain surplus government helicopters through the Defense Logistics Agency 
program;102  or they can contract for services from a private operator. 
With any of these options, the agency may unbundle the responsibility for keeping the 
helicopter well-maintained, safe and for flying it effectively. For example, it could own 
the helicopter and contract with a private operator for maintenance; it could own the 
helicopter and contract with a private operator for pilots and TFOs; or it could do 
everything itself. 
Much, but not all, of the choice among the four options ordinarily is driven by cost: if 
contracting costs less than owning a helicopter, it is an attractive option. 
As important as cost, however, especially in the law-enforcement community, is culture 
and experience. As § VI.C.3 explains, it is far easier for a TFO who has significant on-
the-ground law enforcement experience to do a good job flying a mission and 
coordinating with ground forces. That also may be true of the pilot, but less so. Not only 
does an experienced law-enforcement officer instinctively know how to provide good 
support; ground personnel are more likely to trust him.  
Public-safety organization with sufficient budgets can buy one or more helicopters and 
perform all operational functions themselves. Examples are the Los Angeles Police 
Department, the Chicago Police Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 103 the 
Maryland State Police, 104 and the California Highway Patrol,105 and some smaller 
                                                 
101  Leasing is another possibility, but this section does not consider leasing separately because a lease can 
be structure to be almost indistinguishable from a purchase, such as a 20-year dry lease for a helicopter 
alone, without associated services. Or it can be structured to be almost indistinguishable from the 
contract for services, say a six-month lease for a helicopter with crew and maintenance support. 






departments such as the El Monte, and Fontana, California, police departments. But 
most agencies cannot afford to own helicopters.106 
Nor is it easy for them to contract for helicopter support. Some functions are so 
specialized that public-safety departments are unlikely to find the requisite capability in 
the marketplace. Economies of scale107 that might exist for flight activities such as rides 
and tours, executive charter, and flight training, do not exist as between these activities 
and law-enforcement support. A fair amount of specialized equipment is necessary for 
effective law-enforcement support. Installation of such equipment in a helicopter makes 
it less suitable for the other flight activities that most local operators want to use their 
helicopters for. 
Moreover, a private operator is less likely to have access to a labor market from which 
the most desirable TFOs and pilots should be recruited. A law-enforcement agency that 
organizes helicopter support internally has more options for integrating the helicopter 
support with its regular law enforcement activities. 
On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that a national, more specialized operator 
might emerge. Such an operator would have a better understanding of best practices 
and good examples from other jurisdictions and could have a pool of seasoned TFOs 
and pilots who have the requisite law enforcement experience and have worked in 
similar functions elsewhere. The reason may have less to do with economics, considered 
more broadly in § V.B, than with law-enforcement culture that is skeptical of 
commercial operators’ capacity to understand public-safety, particularly law-
enforcement, needs. 
Fontana, California, provides an example of the internalization of a helicopter support 
operation formerly performed by a contractor.  
                                                 
106 In 2007, the United States had some 13,000 local police departments, 3,000 sheriffs' offices with primary 
law enforcement jurisdiction, and 49 state police agencies. DOJ Sheriff Statistics at p.6 (Table 1). Only 
seven percent of sheriffs' offices used aviation assets, although the number rose to 59% for offices serving 
populations of one million or more, and 41% for populations of 500,000 to one million. The percent drops 
to twelve percent and continues to decline in proportion to size for populations of 250,000 or less. DOJ 
Sheriff Statistics at p.10 (Table 21). Those using aviation assets use helicopters more than fixed-wing 
aircraft. DOJ Sheriff Statistics at p.13 (Table 26). 
107   § V.B explains economies of scale and scope. 
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Fontana contracted with a private operator to fly dedicated helicopter support for 
Fontana with one R44. The private operator was owned by an airline pilot who 
managed the operation remotely. It flew with part-time pilot, each one assigned a day 
of the week. Over time, the contract operation was increasingly unsatisfactory, largely 
manifested in poor housekeeping of hanger space and of the helicopters, although no 
threats to safety were evident. The problem seemed to be that no one involved with the 
private operator had sufficient personal involvement in the operation to take any real 
pride. 
Faulker had unsuccessfully lobbied two previous chiefs to make a change in the private 
operator. He finally went to the third chief, himself an airplane pilot, and said, "We're 
paying $500,000 a year to the private operator. Make the $500,000 available to me, and 
I'll show you that we can set up our own operation, and that it will meet our needs 
much better.  
The chief, with some trepidation, agreed, and allowed Faulkner to sell the idea to the 
city council. After he gained approval, Faulker shopped aggressively for used R44s; he 
knew that he could not set up operation with his $500,000 and use a larger helicopter. 
He was familiar with the R44 capabilities from his flying with El Monte, and the city 
was familiar with the aircraft because of this relationship with the contract operator. 
He found an R44-law enforcement version with only 140 hours on it that had been 
bought by an Australian agency that had never flown it on a mission because of local 
personnel hostility to Robinson helicopters. It was sitting at the Long Beach airport, not 
flying. He made a deal for it, and put another $100,000 into refurbishing it and adding 
appropriate radio equipment 
The aircraft flew some 1300 hours in its first year of operation and was down for 
maintenance for only three days of promised availability. During the first year, the air 
support unit was under-budget. 
Now, the Department flies the R44, an R66 turbine model, and has another R66 on 
order. Section VI.D recounts Faulkner’s leadership. 
B. Market structure and contract operators 
Whether public-safety contract services are available depends on the market structure 
of the helicopter industry. The structure of the helicopter industry, as for any industry, 
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is determined by economies of scale,108 economies of scope,109 and economic barriers to 
entry.110 These are not entirely independent concepts. If one market can be served 
effectively only with a $3 million helicopter, the cost of that asset represents a barrier to 
entry. Its cost also suggests economies of scale. If the market supports only ten flight 
hours per month, and the helicopter is too specialized to be useful in other market 
segments, the rate of return will be far too low to justify investment. On the other hand, 
if the market supports one hundred flight hours per month, the investment can be 
justified.111 The larger scale of the hundred-hour market drives the economics into 
positive territory. 
Whether economies of scale can be captured by an enterprise is a question different 
from whether they exist. An operator might have a helicopter that needs one-hundred 
flight hours per month to break even, but lack the number of pilots needed to fly it that 
much, or lack the marketing capacity to pull in that many customers. Another firm with 
the same helicopter, more marketing muscle, and a more robust stable of pilots could 
realize the economies of scale. 
                                                 
108 Economies of scale exist when a larger seller is more efficient than a smaller seller because of its size. 
When economies of scale exist in an industry, one expects to see consolidation: fewer, larger sellers, 
reflecting concentration. When economies of scale do not exist or if diseconomies of scale exist, one 
expects to see more, smaller operators, reflecting fragmentation. 
109 Economies of scope exist when sellers with a wider range of products are more efficient than sellers 
with a more limited range. Economies of scope exist when a seller can lower his per-unit costs by offering 
more than one product line. For example if the seller of peanut butter also sells jelly and bread, its costs 
per unit sold are lower than if it sells peanut butter alone. Peanut butter, jelly, bread are complementary 
products, and are usually sold together. One sales call and one delivery trip can provide all three 
products to retailers at the same cost for providing peanut butter alone. When economies of scope exist, 
diversification is the norm. When economies of scope do not exist, specialization is the norm. 
110 Barriers to entry can be direct and monetary in nature or they can be indirect and involve time or 
psychological values. For example, a person might be choosing between earning a living as a newspaper 
route deliveryman or starting up a helicopter service, say by buying a helicopter and offering rides and 
tours. The barriers to entry are vastly different. If he chooses the aviation option, he has to buy or lease a 
helicopter and get trained as a pilot, which requires both substantial time and substantial money. If he 
chooses the newspaper delivery option the barriers to entry are close to zero, especially if he already has a 
car. 
111 Depending, of course, on what price per flight hour buyers are willing to pay. 
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The industry structures of different segments of the helicopter services market illustrate 
these economic considerations. EMS is dominated by large national operators112 Air 
Methods113 has more than 400 Helicopters, deployed at some 300 operating bases. Most 
of its helicopters serve more than one healthcare institution.114 Air Evac is only a little 
smaller and performs a similar role.115 In some cases, EMS helicopters are shared 
through a non-profit organized by healthcare providers.116 For example, CareFlite is a 
Texas, nonprofit 501(c)(3) controlled by five Dallas-area hospital systems.117 CareFlite 
responds to requests from hospitals, fire departments, EMS agencies and law 
enforcement within a service area of more than 100 counties in a 150-mile radius of the 
Dallas/Fort Worth Metroplex.118 
Some large regional or national operators serve the EMS market as well as other 
markets. Large oil-and-gas operators, for example, also have a presence in the EMS 
market. PHI, Inc.119 bills itself as the "total helicopter company," flying offshore oil and 
gas, air medical, and onshore mining missions.120 Based in Lafayette, LA, it flies 165 
helicopters for offshore oil and gas missions out of 45 PHI heliports around the world.121  
                                                 
112 Air Methods and Air Evac are dominant national operators.  Hospital Wing is a non-profit air medical 
transport partnership with local hospitals, in the vicinity of Memphis. https://www.hospitalwing.com/ 
(describing availability of seven helicopters--six Eurocopter Astar AS350B3's and one Eurocopter 
EC130B4--to provides inter-hospital transfers as well as emergency scene calls within 150 mile radius of 
Memphis, including West Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Alabama, and Kentucky). 
113  http://www.airmethods.com/. 
114  Air Methods, 2012 Annual Report, http://www.airmethods.com/airmethods/investors/financial-
reports/detail/2013/03/01/air-methods-2012-annual-report#.Uoja9vmkra1 [hereinafter “Air Methods 2012 
Report”]. 
115 CITE 
116 The FAA reports that there are 74 air ambulance companies that operate about 850 helicopters in the 
United States.  Fact Sheet – FAA Initiatives to Improve Helicopter Air Ambulance Safety, 
http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=11957 (Oct. 7, 2010). 
117 Texas Health Resources (Harris Methodist, Presbyterian and Arlington Memorial Hospitals), 
Methodist Health System, Baylor Health Care System, Parkland Health and Hospital System, and the JPS 
Health Network. 
118  http://www.careflite.org/AboutUs.aspx. 
119 www.phihelico.com. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. It flies a fleet of Bell 206Ls, Bell 407s, AS350B2s, BK117s, EC-145s, EC135s, Bells 222s, Bell 430s, Bell 
212s, Bell 412s, Sikorsky S-76As, AW 139s, and Sikorsky S-92s. Id. See also PHI Annual Report at 16 
(detailing numbers of specific types). 
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Oil and gas is its strategic focus.122 Era Helicopters, LLC 123 is a somewhat smaller 
operator--170 helicopters--serving the offshore oil and gas transport, air medical 
services, search and rescue operations (SAR), firefighting, flightseeing, and disaster 
relief markets.  Most of its revenue comes from oil and gas activities, with only seven 
percent from air medical services.124  
Helicopter ENG is another segment where concentration is high. U.S. helicopters, based 
in North Carolina,125 and Helicopters, Inc., based in St. Louis, dominate this market. 
Both provide full-service, turnkey, contracts to local stations. Although ENG 
Helicopters typically are branded to one station, wearing the livery of that station, 
resources are shared, in the sense that the contractor is responsible for recruiting, 
training, and dispatching pilots and equipment operators and for maintaining the 
helicopters.126  
Industrial helicopter operations also are concentrated, although operators tend to be 
regional rather than national. Haverfield127and Air 2128 are examples. 
At the other end of the size spectrum, hundreds of air-taxi and flight-training operators 
exist, typically having two or three helicopters.129 Most of these operators offer rides and 
tours; executive-charter; and aerial photography.  
This industry prompts two questions: (1) Why are some parts of the industry 
fragmented while other parts are consolidated, and (2) Why do not public safety 
agencies contract for helicopter support, like hospitals and television stations?  
                                                 
122 PHI, Inc. Annual Report at 2 (2012), 
http://www.phihelico.com/docs/Investor%20Relations/2012/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf [hereinafter 
"PHI Annual Report"]. 
123 http://www.erahelicopters.com/content; Era Helicopters, LLC, Annual Report (2012), 
http://ir.stockpr.com/eragroupinc/annual-reports/content/0001525221-13-000046/0001525221-13-
000046.pdf [hereinafter "Era Annual Report"]. 
124 Era Annual Report at 37. 
125  See http://www.ushelicoptersinc.com/ 
126  The pictures on the homepage of U.S. Helicopters website all are of helicopters painted with a local TV 
station's logo. 
127   http://www.haverfield.com/ (electric power lines). 
128   http://air2.com/ (electric power lines) 
129 Some, like Hillsboro Aviation, www.hillsboroaviation.com/; and Bristow Academy, 
http://www.heli.com/, have much larger fleets. 
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In a perfect market, users of helicopter services—including public safety agencies--
would contract out—purchase the services in the marketplace—if it is more efficient to 
do so than to perform the services internally.  
Several factors inhibit contracting with private operators for public safety helicopter 
support. Diseconomies of scope discourage operators from seeking to penetrate this 
market. A small commercial operator does not need a FLIR camera, a searchlight, or 
radio communications on public safety frequencies to conduct its rides-and-tours and 
executive charter business. It does not need tactical flight officers. It could, of course, 
invest in these additional items of physical and human capital, but it is not clear that it 
would achieve advantages in the marketplace from doing so. The equipment and skills 
useful for public safety support would go unutilized in its original line of business. 
But that accounts for the absence only of the smaller operators. Why do not larger 
national or regional EMS, industrial, ENG, or oil-and-gas operators have a piece of the 
public-safety market? Why is a private-contract sharing model so robust for ENG and 
EMS, and almost entirely absent for search and rescue, natural disaster, counter-
terrorism, and law-enforcement support? The economies of scale are substantial for all 
of them. For example, Air Methods dispatches most of its community-based locations 
and some hospital-based locations from a centralized dispatch facility in Omaha.130 
Maintenance for a larger fleet can be organized more efficiently than for one or two 
helicopters.  
One answer is that the elasticity of demand in the healthcare, commercial broadcasting, 
and oil-and-gas exploration is lower—customers find it easier to justify paying the full 
cost of helicopter support. The debate over health care reform long has recognized that 
price resistance is almost entirely absent in the market for healthcare services. Eighty 
percent of Air Methods revenue involves fixed monthly fees and twenty percent hourly 
flight fees, and does not depend on when or if customers are reimbursed by patients, 
healthcare insurers, or the federal government.131 Indeed, most of the reforms over the 
last twenty years have focused on trying to introduce incentives to control price and 
quantity of services consumed.  
                                                 
130  Air Methods 2012 Report at 2. 
131  Air Methods 2012 Report at 1. 
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As with other medical services, when a healthcare provider decides that helicopter 
transport is necessary to save a life or to avoid greater morbidity, he simply orders the 
service, and it is provided, with reimbursement details to be worked out later. Similarly, 
an ongoing ratings war drives the behavior of broadcasters. If one station in a market 
flies helicopter to provide viewers with overhead photography of traffic congestion and 
emergency incidents, every other station in the market is likely to follow suit. 
These forces do not operate in the broader market for public safety support. Law-
enforcement budgets are controlled at the local level where helicopters often are 
perceived as an expensive toy and budgets are tight. A contract with even a small 
operator is likely to cost an agency $500-700,000 per year. The agency can buy a 
Robinson R44 for that, as the Fontana, CA, story, recounted in §§ V.A and VI.D shows. 
There is less resistance, however, to devoting resources to homeland security and 
natural disaster relief. Accordingly, to the extent that helicopter assets can be useful for 
these purposes, it is more likely that support can be obtained for them.  
This analysis of industry structure suggests that the market is unlikely to provide the 
level of public safety helicopter support that would be optimal from a public interest 
standpoint, and as § V.A observes, law-enforcement culture militates against 
contracting out law-enforcement support services. 
C. ENG and Public Safety 
Journalism and public safety have an uneasy relationship in a free society. On the hand, 
both are attentive to threats to public safety: law enforcement, firefighters, emergency 
preparedness agencies, and paramedics seek to reduce the threats; news gathering 
organizations cover the threats and governmental responses. Public safety and ENG 
helicopters often are overhead the same incidents. 
Moreover, ENG helicopters are well-equipped for police support. Both use FLIR 
cameras, downlink and uplink radio equipment, and sophisticated geospatial mapping 
capability. ENG flight crews have quite similar capabilities to those of police helicopter 
aircrews. Police and ENG helicopters often are interested in the same incidents. 
Explicit sharing arrangements between police and ENG operators are unlikely, 
however; too much mistrust exists between the media and law enforcement. Few law-
enforcement agencies would be willing to share all of their video with news 
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organizations. They are too worried about security of operations and potential liability. 
ENG operators are flying to do a job (to gather news in video form for a TV broadcast) 
for which they are getting paid. They are not getting paid to aid in public safety or assist 
law enforcement helicopters. Sometimes in certain scenarios the station will relay 
messages about a scene to law enforcement. But ENG operators are not likely go out of 
the way to assist. 
On the other hand, cooperation already exists. Both sides understand the need to share 
the sky. ENG operators yield right of way to law enforcement helicopters, so law 
enforcement does not establish a TFR that would impede helicopter news gathering. An 
unwritten code exists between pilots and operators. If ENG operators are first on the 
scene and a law enforcement helicopter comes in, the ENG helicopter will back off or 
climb higher. Typically, law-enforcement helicopters need to fly lower than do properly 
equipped ENG helicopters, which can use their zoom lenses to get the video they need. 
The ENG pilot communicates with the police pilot—usually over a CTAF frequency—
and provides basic details about the scene and the ENG pilot’s intentions, and everyone 
is happy. If ENG is second on the scene, the ENG pilot does not expect details from the 
police pilot; he simply does what he does best: capture the moment without the help of 
law enforcement. As long as the ENG pilot stays out of the way, there is no friction 
between the two. 
On occasion, cooperation is deeper. ENG helicopters have supplemented surveillance or 
search, kept alert for a fleeing vehicle or suspect, plugged holes in a perimeter, or stayed 
on station while the law enforcement helicopter refuels. Such assists are spontaneous. 
The possibility of formalizing them is remote. 
Certain sensitive missions, such as barricade situations, are endangered by 
contemporaneous broadcasts of news imagery. Law enforcement agencies and ENG 
operators could agree on a protocol for designating certain situations in which 
broadcast would be delayed. In exchange, the public safety operator might provide 




D. Mutual aid pacts 
Given the small size of most municipalities, local units cooperate on many public-safety 
matters. 132  Since the early 1970s local governments have explored mechanisms for 
coordinating the resources and activities of local law enforcement, firefighting, public 
health, public works, and private-sector actors.133 
They often do so via a legal structure of long standing, known as a "mutual aid pact." 
Mutual aid pacts, sometimes authorized by ordinance or statute, 134 sometimes 
expressed in intergovernmental contracts, 135 and sometimes completely informal, 
permit or obligate public safety agencies to come to one another's assistance upon 
request. 136 Usually, the responding personnel work under the command of the 
requesting agency.137 In larger incidents, the state police and the FBI may get involved 
as well. 138  
In Illinois for example, law enforcement agency interest in mutual aid agreements grew 
after MABAS,139 a system for statewide mutual aid for fire, emergency medical services 
(EMS) and associated special operational services,140 proved successful. Concretely, the 
Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System requires member agencies to maintain data on 
numbers of officers and supervisors, types and number of vehicles and specialty 
                                                 
132  See generally William C. Nicholson, Seeking Consensus on Homeland Security Standards: Adopting 
the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System, 12 Widener L. Rev. 491 
(2006) [hereinafter "Nicholson"] (analyzing "incident management" initiative to deploy and coordinate 
resources from multiple agencies). 
133  Nicholson at 491. (describing early efforts in California relating to major wildland fires). 
134  HHP CITE 
135  ILEAS has published a standard mutual aid agreement on its website. 
https://www.ileas.org/sites/default/files/main/Member%20Services/mutualaidagreement.pdf. 
136 The Illinois agreement gives law enforcement agencies the option to respond to requests with 
"personnel, equipment, facilities, or services," that are "available." Id. § 3.  
137   "Law enforcement personnel from the aiding agencies shall report to and shall work under the 
direction and supervision of the stricken agency," and are to be made available without reimbursement. 
Illinois Agreeement § 3. 
138  Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://www.justice.gov/jmd/mps/manual/fbi.htm (listing as a major 
priority "Support[ing] federal, state, county, municipal, and international partners"); United States 
Department of Justice ATF, Explosives, http://www.atf.gov/content/explosives (describing "national and 
international response teams"--who assist local and state law enforcement). 
139  Mutual Aid Box Alarm System-Illinois, State Illinois Fire Service Emergency Response Plan (July 
2008), http://www.iafc.org/files/mtlAid_StatePlanIL.pdf 
140  MABAS Description at p.7. 
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equipment, and translators in an ILEAS database. When a member agency requests 
assistance through the ILEAS dispatch center, the dispatcher enters it into the database, 
which creates an "alarm card" that forms the basis of requests for assistance.141 LEAS is 
based on the success of the Northern Illinois Police Alarm System ("NIPAS") which was 
formed in 1983 and now comprises some 93 municipalities in five northern-Illinois 
counties cooperating under NIPAS bylaws and a formal mutual aid agreement. 142  
In 2002, the Congress mandated nationwide adoption of "incident management 
systems,"143 and charged the Department of Homeland Security with the responsibility 
of developing a National Response Plan and National Incident Management System,144 
which was issued on 16 November 2004.145 The plan requires the establishment of local, 
state, and Federal Emergency Prevention and Preparedness Councils (“PPCs”).146  Both 
NFPA 1600 and state law require local emergency management agencies to maintain 
                                                 
141  ILEAS, Mutual Aid, https://www.ileas.org/main/mutual-aid. 
142  See http://www.nipas.org/. See also http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?71843-
Nipas-Est (2006 article on NIPAS recruitment, training, and equipment). "The requesting agency’s 
incident commander contacts the system’s dispatching center, Northwest Central Dispatch System, a 
consortiium of 16 police and fire departments in northwest Cook County. http://www.nwcds.org/, and 
identifies the level of response needed. There are ten levels, each one calling for an additional five officers 
to respond according to a pre-determined alarm plan. Thus, Level 1 requires five officers to respond; 
Level 10 requires fifty. 
“The dispatch center quickly sends the appropriate number of fully equipped officers to a pre-selected 
mobilization point within the requesting agency’s jurisdiction. The incident commander also deploys a 
personnel officer, who records each officer’s arrival and assigns each one as required." 
http://www.nipas.org/ ("Activating the System"). 
143   6 U.S.C. § 314(a)(5) (giving Secretary of Homeland Security and FEMA Administrator responsibility 
for "building a comprehensive national incident management system with Federal, State, and local 
government personnel, agencies, and authorities"). See http://www.fema.gov/national-incident-
management-system (providing links to NIMS resources) 
144  See 6 U.S.C. § 320 (requiring "compacts" with local authorities to develop and publish standards for 
deployment capabilities and personnel). See generally FEMA, National Response Framework (2d ed. 
2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-
1246/final_national_response_framework_20130501.pdf. 
145  Nicholson at 494. 
146  Nicholson at 501-502. 
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local disaster emergency plans.147 Mutual aid agreements are an essential part of these 
plans.148 FEMA assists local agencies with training.149 
The Incident Command System (ICS)150 is part of NIMS and provides a method of 
unified command in which all responders operate under the direction of the person in 
charge of the incident. It has a brief section on organization of air operations.151 
The Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act,152 authorizes the establishment of an 
Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA)153  
E. State and county helicopter units 
One obvious institutional mechanism for providing shared helicopter assets to smaller 
public safety agencies is to have the state or county provide them. The Maryland State 
Police is an example. The Masschusetts State Police is more modest example. 
The Massachusetts State Police makes available one of its helicopters to fly overhead 
patrols for the Boston Police Department.154 
The limitation on this approach is uncertain availability to meet local demands, as the 
Fontana, CA experience with the San Bernadino Sheriff’s Department, shows.155 
F. The Air-One model 
Air-One156 operations are headquartered at the Waukegan airport, in the northeast 
corner of Illinois. It uses volunteers157 to pilot a fleet of some seven helicopters158 
                                                 
147  Nicholson at 540. 
148  Nicholson at 541. 
149   44 CFR § 360.2 (detailing process for applying for FEMA assistance) 
150  http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_AppendixB.pdf. 
151  Id. at 101-102. 
152   20 ILCS 3305/1, 
153  http://www.state.il.us/iema/. See also Advisory Legal Opinion - AGO 99-22 (April 28, 1999), 
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/1DFC2FBB064AB97D85256761006D4C6D;  
http://www.ncsheriffs.org/documents/Mutual-Aid-Agreement-Oct2008.pdf. 
154  http://www.policeone.com/news/1231356-Boston-patrols-troopers-team-up-in-copters/ (2007) 
155 See § ___. 
156 Air-One is a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation organized under the laws of Illinois.  
http://www.airsupport.org/ 




donated to Air-One by the Defense Department surplus program for law 
enforcement.159 Air-One resources are dispatched by the Winthrop Harbor Police 
Department.  
Air-One’s helicopters formally are registered to police and sheriff’s departments in 
Illinois and Wisconsin. Air-One provides the operational infrastructure. This 
arrangement is to allow Air-One’s helicopters to qualify as “public aircraft.”160 
                                                                                                                                                             
158 Bell OH-58C N79PD (received 2006; operational; registered to Winthrop Harbor Police Department); 
Bell OH-58C N92PD (received 2007; operational; registered to Byron, Illinois Police Department); OH-58C 
N62PD (received 2007; Refurbishment and equipment additions underway; registered to Stephenson 
County, Illinois Sheriff's Office. It was received from the DoD in January, 2007); OH-58C N381WC 
(received 2012; refurbishment and equipment additional underway; registered to Winthrop Harbor Police 
Department); Bell UH-1V N67PD (received  2009; refurbishment and equipment additional underway; 
registered to Winthrop Harbor Police Department); Bell HH-1N N88SD (received 2011; refurbishment 
and equipment additions underway; registered to Kenosha County, Wisconsin Sheriff's Office);  
Its operations began with the donation of a Eurocopter EC135 by a private owner. The EC135 was sold in 
2007. www.airsupport.org (About Air-One: Aircraft). 
159   10 USC § 2576a (authorizing transfer of excess property on as-is basis); Defense Logistics Agency 
Disposition Services, https://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/rtd03/leso/index.shtml (describing 
authorization for disposition of excess DOD property to federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies) Defense Logistics Agency. A Defense Logistics Agency video, 
http://www.dla.mil/DLA_Media_Center/Pages/newsarticle201301151140.aspx (explaining transfer of 
surplus helicopters). 
160  "Public aircraft" is statutorily defined as: 
"(C) An aircraft owned and operated by the government of a State, the District of Columbia, or a territory 
or possession of the United States or a political subdivision of one of these governments, except as 
provided in section 40125(b)." 49 U.S.C. § 40102(41). 49 U.S.C. § 40125(b) divests an aircraft of its public 
aircraft status if it is used for commercial purposes or to carry an individual other than a crewmember of 
qualified non-crewmember. 49 U.S.C. § 40125(a) allows aircraft to be used by one governmental entity on 
behalf of another with reimbursement without losing its public aircraft status. This is subject to a proviso 
that "that no service by a private operator is reasonably available to meet the threat." 49 U.S.C. § 
40125(a)(1). The Federal Aviation Regulations (“FARs”) define "civil aircraft" to exclude "public aircraft," 
14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (definitions). and define "public aircraft" as: 
"an aircraft owned and operated by the government of a State, the District of Columbia, or a territory or 
possession of the United States or a political subdivision of one of these governments; or an aircraft 
exclusively leased for at least 90 continuous days by the government of a State, the District of Columbia, 
or a territory or possession of the United States or a political subdivision of one of these governments,” 
but only when such aircraft are "not being used for a commercial purpose or to carry an individual other 




Air-One flies public safety missions throughout northern Illinois and southern 
Wisconsin. Local departments are not charged for these operations. Air-One covers its 
operating costs through a combination of private donations, grants from government 
agencies, and the flow of equipment donations from the federal government. Its 
organization and personnel are closely integrated with law enforcement and public 
safety departments. 
The Air-One model offers significant advantages over the alternatives considered in this 
part. It also has some shortcomings, analyzed in Part VI. Because Air-One uses 
volunteer aircrew personnel, it reduces personnel costs. Because the availability of Air-
One’s support does not obligate public-safety agencies to enter into contracts, it 
provides flexibility to the agencies.Because Air-One helicopter services are available on-
demand without requiring public safety agencies to own their own helicopters, it 
significantly reduces political barriers to use.  
The relationship between Air-One and public-safety agencies is not, however, entirely 
arms-length, and this provides another advantage. Most of the members of Air-One’s 
board of directors are public safety personnel, ranging from the sheriffs of Lake County, 
Illinois and Kenosha County, Wisconsin to police chiefs and other senior law-
enforcement personnel from the two states. Air-One’s operational supervision also is 
conducted mainly by people holding positions in the municipal law enforcement 
agencies. Beyond this means of integration between service provider and service user, 
the integration is strengthened further by the policies of some public safety agencies 
                                                                                                                                                             
FAA Administrator may exempt a federal, state, or local government from any regulation if he finds that 
the exemption is necessary to prevent an undue economic burden and that the unit of government has an 
effective and appropriate aviation safety program. 14 C.F.R. § 11.103.  
"The distinction between civil and public aircraft is that public aircraft are excepted from many FAA 
regulations. " 68 Fed. Reg. 25486-02 (May 13, 2003). For example, airworthiness, flight manual, and 
placard requirements only apply to "civil aircraft." 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.7, 91.8. The same is true of the 
prohibition against dropping objects that may create a hazard to persons or property. 14 C.F.R. § 
91.15. The maintenance requirements in Subpart E apply only to "civil aircraft." 14 C.F.R. § 91.401(a). 
On the other hand, basic flight rules apply to all aircraft. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.101. This includes VFR 




who are making their on-duty sworn personnel available to serve on Air-One aircrews. 
Also, some public safety agencies pay the cost of fuel for specific missions.  
The Air-One model offers the same advantages as contract provision of helicopter 
services for EMS and ENG, while avoiding the barriers for use of these private sector 
models for broad spectrum of public safety support, by relieving the public safety users 
of the cost of helicopter acquisition, wages, and maintenance costs. 
The question, of course, as §VI.C.1 considers, is whether this volunteer model is 
sustainable. It is for volunteer fire department and for the CAP, but both them receive 
substantial subsidies from different levels of government. 
VI. Extending the air one model and overcoming obstacles 
Despite the attractive nature of the Air-One model, its services are not being used as 
intensively by Illinois and Wisconsin public-safety agencies as they could be. This part 
identifies the barriers that stand in the way of greater utilization and suggests ways to 
overcome them, in light of the achievements of other public-safety helicopter operations 
involving shared resources. 
The major barriers to wider use of the Air-One model, both in its existing service area 
and in other states, relate to educating potential requesting agencies about the utility of 
helicopter support and the way to use it most effectively. Otherwise any operator like 
Air-One will be either ignored or besieged with unsuitable requests that lead to 
disappointment. Illinois and Wisconsin are not like California, where helicopter support 
of public safety has been well-accepted for years. 
The place to start is to make sure everyone understands the determinants of success. In 




A. Determinants of success 
1. Integration of air and ground forces 
Effective coordination of helicopter and ground assets is essential for effectiveness.161 
This can be accomplished by direct communication between aircrew and individual 
ground units, as in patrol support, or it can be accomplished by more formal, military-
style command and control protocols.162 
The key to good coordination is well-trained and experienced TFOs, and an 
appreciation by ground personnel of the power of helicopter assets. 
2. Building support in the public safety community 
Training police personnel to utilize helicopter assets and adopting AirOne doctrine 
would greatly increase the effectiveness of helicopter assets.  
What the public sees on television--the long automatic weapons, the armored vehicles, 
the helmets and vests--are less important than more mundane things relating to 
communication and coordination.163 
To a considerable extent, good coordination of air and ground forces is a function of 
good basic training for public safety departments. 164  
Competition and game-playing exists in the public safety community, just like 
everywhere else. In one case, a helicopter support unit declined to respond to any calls 
after 11 PM, even though it had resources available. When the helicopter unit from an 
adjoining jurisdiction responded to a backup call after the first unit refused, a minor 
bureaucratic turf war ensued, because the first unit intended its unresponsiveness to 
                                                 
161  Tony L. Jones, SWAT Leadership and Tactical Planning 31 (1996) 31 (stressing need for effective 
command to assure members work as a team) [hereinafter "SWAT"]; Tactical Primer ch. 4 ("Command 
and Control Architecture") (describing effective command-and-control structures for civilian law-
enforcement). “[Helicopters] with [their] reconnaissance and security assets can assist the force 
commander by providing accurate information in virtually all environmental conditions and throughout 
the full spectrum of conflict." FM 1-100 at 1-11. See also See also U.S. Army, Utility and Cargo Helicopter 
Operations, FM 3-04.113 (FM1-113), 
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_04x113.pdf [hereinafter "FM1-113"], at B-3 
(specifying methods of coordinating air and ground assets). 
162  
163  Charles "Sid" Heal, Field Command xxv (2012) [hereinafter "Field Command"]. 
164  See SWAT 75 (explaining elements of tactical chain of command) 
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build pressure from political authorities to provide additional resources. Adopting the 
AirOne model would reduce such gamesmanship.  
In addition to being a good framework for helicopter operations in support of public 
safety agencies, the Air-One model makes it more likely training will take place on a 
statewide basis. When public safety agencies own helicopter assets separately and use 
them only for their own missions, they have no incentive to train the personnel of other 
departments. Many public safety agencies protect their independence from each other, 
even to the point of the Chicago police165 and fire departments maintaining separate 
helicopter operations. 
The Air-One model also provides a stronger justification for state funding of training, 
less when individual departments own helicopter assets. Then, it is easy for state 
legislatures and executive agencies to say, “do, and pay for, your own training.” 
Public safety personnel must think of helicopters at the beginning of a crisis when they 
might be useful. It does little good not to call for helicopter support until twelve or so 
hours after a search has begun. Thinking, "We tried everything else and it hasn't 
worked. Let's see if the helicopter can help out," in not an effective approach. 
In Air-One’s case, its willingness to embrace new ideas for deploying and managing 
public safety resources increased, once it added persons from the firefighting 
community to its board.  
B. Fear of liability 
Concern about increased liability is a major barrier to sharing helicopter resources. 
Nearly every requesting agency already is concerned about liability and has insurance 
coverage to protect against the risk.166 
                                                 
165  See Chicago Police Marine and Helicopter Units, 
https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/About%20CPD/Specialized%20Units/Marin
e%20and%20Helecopter%20Unit (describing use of two helicopters). 
166  See Michael A. Brave & Steven D. Ashley, Law Enforcement Jurisdictional Issues, 
http://www.ecdlaw.info/outlines/Brave%20-%20Article%20-
%20Managing%20the%20Risk%20of%20LE%20Jurisdictional%20Problems.pdf (discussing risk 
management and other issues when law-enforcement officers operate outside their primary geographic 
boundaries, pursuant to mutual aid pacts and otherwise). 
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1. Sources of liability from using helicopters and from failing to use 
them 
Naturally, when an agency is presented with an idea for new capabilities, especially if 
they are to be shared, the question arises whether the assisted municipality might incur 
liability that would not be covered by insurance and/or whether the assisting entity 
would have insurance coverage. To some extent this may be a red herring; all public 
safety agencies face liability concerns, especially with respect to allegations of police 
violation of civil rights.167 Liability associated with these missteps far exceed liability for 
a helicopter mishap. But careful economic analysis and quantification of risk may not 
matter. Municipal decision-makers, already worried about liability for police 
misconduct, may simply be risk-averse when it comes to any new source of liability. 
There is little doubt that entities contracting for helicopter support may be liable for 
injuries resulting from crashes.168 In Talbott v. Roswell Hospital Corp.,169 for example, 
the New Mexico intermediate court affirmed judgment on a jury verdict for the victim 
of a helicopter crash during a public-safety training exercise. Among other things, the 
evidence showed that the hospital defendant failed to make inquiry that would have 
revealed "internal problems and leadership" issues in the operation of its independent 
contractor helicopter operator that would jeopardize safe operation.170 
Conflicting demands on both sides need not prevent an agreement. Illinois law 
expressly permits local public entities to shift liability pursuant to agreement.171 Such 
agreements are common in the context of mutual aid pacts. The relevant topic for 
negotiation is not speculation over liability exposure, but how it should be insured 
against, considered in § Error! Reference source not found.Error! Reference source not 
found.. 
                                                 
167  See See, e.g. Garcia v. O'Keefe, 825 N.Y.S.2d 38 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (reversing $206 million judgment 
for plaintiff on police brutality claim); see generally Tactical Primer at 20-21 (reviewing indications of 
increasing liability exposure for civilian law enforcement). 
168  In re September 11 Litigation, 280 F. Supp.2d 279, 291-293 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (extensively reviewing 
caselaw establishing duty to persons on the ground). 
169   192 F.3d 267 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). 
170   192 P.3d at 274. 
171   745 Ill. Cons. Stat. 10/7-101. 
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What should be in the spotlight of risk management is the possibility that public-safety-
agency liability may be increased by failure to use helicopter assets.172  
While it is plausible that a public safety agency may be liable for mishaps resulting from 
helicopter support of its operations, it is also plausible that it might be liable for not 
using helicopter support.  
Sovereign immunity is not the barrier it once was. In Prough v. Madison County,173 the 
estate of a victim sued for damages, claiming that the sheriff's department improperly 
released a shooter from custody. The court explained the demise of absolute common-
law sovereign immunity in Illinois and its replacement by a limited statutory waiver.174 
Now, a unit of local government is liable in tort to the same extent as a private party 
unless it can establish an immunity under the state Tort Immunity Act.175  
A plaintiff’s argument would comprise three elements: 
1. The public safety agency had a duty to avoid foreseeable risks of harm to the 
public; 
2. Failure to employ helicopter support was a wanton and willful disregard of best 
practices; 
3. Employment of best practices would have prevented the harm to the plaintiff. 
Public safety agencies have the same duty that anyone has to avoid forseeable injury 
resulting from affirmative acts.  
Whether an agency also has a duty to act—a duty to protect a potential victim—
depends on whether defendant law-enforcement agencies have a “special relationship” 
with the victim.176 Physicians and surgeons have a special relationship with their 
patients, resulting in a heightened standard of care. Similarly, in the law enforcement 
context, law enforcement agencies regularly avoid liability to members of the general 
                                                 
172  See generally Field Command at 7-10 (describing law enforcement "fiascos" and their potential to lead 
to increased liability). 
173   984 N.E.2d 1177 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
174   984 N.E.2d at 1182-1183. 
175   984 N.E.2d at 1183. 
176  Beers v. Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, ___ P.3d ___, No. 
39319, 2013 WS 6184050 hns 6-8 (Idaho Nov. 26, 2013) (explaining special relationship requirement in 
negligence law and finding that it did not exist between church and victim of church campout accident). 
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public under the "public duty" doctrine, which can be overcome, however, by showing 
that a public agency had a special relationship with the victim.177 
A plaintiff seeking to base liability on failure to use helicopter support could establish a 
special relationship and premise breach on failure to use best practices to protect the 
public, of which the victim was a member. 
Or the plaintiff could focus its breach argument on what the public-safety did instead—
conducting a high-speed vehicle chase on the ground, for example. That would premise 
its breach theory on affirmative acts creating a foreseeable risk of harm. 
Public safety agencies have a duty, circumscribed by sovereign immunity, to avoid 
foreseeable risks of harm arising from the affirmative conduct of their employees and 
contractors. That they also may have a duty to avoid foreseeable risks of harm arising 
from a failure to act is arguable.178 
Plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases regularly recover based on evidence that the 
defendants failed to use best practices in providing care. In Rosa v. Lawrence and 
Memorial Hospital, 179for example, the Connecticut intermediate court affirmed a multi-
million dollar verdict for malpractice against an anesthesia provider for using the 
wrong device to administer anesthesia.180 Medical malpractice caselaw can be extended 
to the public-safety context only by establishing a “special relationship” between 
public-safety agencies and members of the public who are injured by their practices. 
Plaintiffs recover for law-enforcement “fiascos,” with the courts evading an explicit 
decision on whether a special relationship was established. In such cases, avoiding 
sovereign immunity flows from establishing breach of duty under a heightened 
standard. In Rivera v. Garcia,181 the Illinois intermediate court reinstated a jury verdict 
and held that the parents of a teenager were entitled to recover damages for injuries and 
                                                 
177  See Gates v. United States, 928 F. Supp.2d 63, 69 (D.D.C. 2013) (explaining relationship between public 
duty doctrine and special relationship). 
178  Bracken v. Okura, ___ F. Supp.2 ___, Civil No. 11–00784 LEK–BMK, 2013 WL 3223873 hn 24 (D. 
Hawaii June 24, 2013) (distinguishing between failure to act and affirmative acts under section 1983; 
granting summary judgment to defendants). 
179  74 A.3d 534 (Conn. Ct. App. 2013). 
180   74 A.3d at 542 (summarizing expert testimony on the standard of care). 
181   927 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
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death resulting from a high-speed police chase. The evidence showed that police 
officers had used an unmarked vehicle, contrary to Chicago Police Department policy.182 
Gunfire ensued and intensified as other police vehicles responded.183 At trial the 
plaintiff introduced police-department procedures on pursuits and the testimony of an 
expert to show that the defendants "reckless, dangerous and nonconforming with 
applicable police practices and that the overall management of the pursuit exhibited a 
conscious disregard for the safety of others" thereby constituting willful and wanton 
conduct--the standard necessary to overcome the statutory immunity.184 On the 
outcome-determinative issue of proximate causation, the appellate court held that the 
harm to the victims was reasonably foreseeable.185 
So, in the context of this article, the first question is when would a foreseeable risk of 
harm arise from failure to use helicopter assets, giving rise to a duty. The second 
question is the standard according to which facts would establish a breach of the duty 
under the willful-and-wanton standard--usually necessary to overcome sovereign 
immunity. 
The basic standard is a familiar one: a duty to avoid foreseeable risks of harm. In 
Commonwealth v. Peterson,186 the Virginia supreme court applied this standard and 
reversed a damages judgment in favor of the estates of victims of the 2007 Virginia Tech 
shootings. The administrators of the estates had filed actions under the Virginia Tort 
Claims Act187 for breach of the duty to warn arising after a foreseeable risk of harm 
occurred because of initial shootings in a Virginia Tech dormitory. The jury, after being 
instructed "the jury was told that if they found that the university employees should 
have reasonably foreseen that injury arising from the criminal conduct of a third party 
might occur but failed to warn students, the Commonwealth should be found 
negligent,"188 awarded $4 million to each plaintiff.  
                                                 
182   927 N.E.2d at 1238. 
183   927 N.E.2d at 1239. 
184   927 N.E.2d at 1240. 
185   927 N.E.2d at 1242-1243. 
186   ___ S.E.2d ___, Record No. 121717, 2013 WL 5833262 (Va. Oct. 31, 2013). 
187  Va. Code§ 8.01-195.1 
188  Id. at *3 (describing jury instruction). 
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The supreme court, without contesting the basic principle, found that the plaintiffs had 
not established breach of the duty. The court held that the university had no basis, after 
the dormitory shootings, to know or reasonably to have foreseen the possibility of harm 
to other students. The initial investigation indicated that the shooter had fled the area 
and posed no danger to others.189 
A public safety agency would be in a different, and less favorable, situation if it claimed 
it had no reason to know that a high-speed car chase without helicopter support would 
risk injury to the public. 
Litigation over the 1993 Branch Davidian conflict near Waco, Texas resulted in rejection 
of the plaintiff's claims that the government's decisions to use tear gas, tanks, its failure 
to plan for a fire, all fell within the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort 
Claims Act.190  
Two things are notable about the litigation. First, is the basis on which the district court 
rejected the claim that the absence of firefighting equipment should result in FTCA 
liability: the absence of proof that armored fire fighting vehicles that were available 
would have been effective.191 Second, is the use of recordings from a FLIR camera 
mounted on an FBI helicopter to reject certain factual claims.192 
By negative implication from the first finding, a tort plaintiff could recover if he could 
show that helicopter assets were available and if they had been used in a particular 
way, they would have prevented harm. 
In a number of cases, plaintiffs have sought to recover under section 1983 or at common 
law based on evidence that public safety agencies failed to use best practices. In Ewans 
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,193 the court of appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed 
summary judgment for a bank that reported a suspicious (but innocent) customer to the 
police, resulting in a substantial overreaction by the police. The court held that the 
evidence did not show that bank employees had breached their duty of care. "[O]ur 
                                                 
189  Id. at hn 10. 
190  Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2003). 
191  Andrade v. United States, 111 F. Supp.2d 778, 785 (W.D. Tex. 2000). 
192   116 F. Supp.2d at 785-786. 
193   389 Fed. Appx. 383 (5th Cir. 2010), 
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holding is unaffected by either side's testimony of “best practices.” Negligence law is 
concerned with reasonable practices, not best practices," it said.194  
The results show how difficult it is to succeed on such claims, but they also show what 
the analytical framework is for recovery based on failure to use helicopter assets 
appropriately. 
In Glass v. City of Philadelpha,195 victims of alleged police brutality in Philadelphia 
sued under section 1983. They claimed that the son of one of the plaintiffs was beaten 
up and then that the police retaliated for a resulting lawsuit by harassing and 
intimidating the plaintiffs.196 Among other things, the plaintiffs alleged a cover-up 
conspiracy and a failure by the police department to investigate their complaints.197 To 
analyze the claims, the court detailed the internal organization and procedures of the 
police department.198 Among other things, the court reviewed in detail procedures for 
handcuffing arrestees,199 the steps taken to investigate complaints,200 and the 
computerized system for tracking outstanding warrants.201  
The court applied the familiar standard for determining municipal liability under 
section 1983: “[P]laintiffs must identify a municipal policy or custom that amounts to 
deliberate indifference to the rights of people with whom the police come into 
contact.”202 And, of course, they must establish causation. "203 In the particular case, the 
plaintiffs' theory was premised on flaws in the "sufficiency and legitimacy of the 
process employed" by the police department to investigate complaints.204 The court held 
that the system was "commensurate with the ‘best practices’ employed by other police 
departments of similar size."205 The court found liability for certain constitutional 
                                                 
194   389 Fed. Appx. at 390. 
195   455 F. Supp.2d 302 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
196   455 F. Supp.2d at 310-311 (reviewing allegations). 
197   455 F. Supp.2d at 312. 
198   455 F. Supp.2d at 312-315. 
199   455 F. Supp.2d at 320 n.20. 
200  See, e.g. 455 F. Supp.2d at 334 & n.53. 
201   455 F. Supp.2d at 329-332. 
202   455 F. Supp.2d at 341 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
203   455 F. Supp.2d at 342. 
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violations involving detention without probable cause and for common-law false arrest, 
but rejected the other claims.206 
Establishing the breach-of-duty element would depend on evidence that sound 
practices established in the public-safety community involve effective deployment of 
helicopter assets in similar situations. Such evidence is abundant from California, where 
the use of helicopter assets and procedures for coordinating air and ground forces has 
been widely established. 
Establishing causation is likely to be the greatest challenge. 
In Kleisch v. Cleveland State University,207 the Ohio intermediate court, in an 
unreported opinion, rejected a negligence claim by a victim of a rape on a university 
campus. The plaintiff claimed that an understaffed campus police department, and a 
failure to use available security technologies, breached the defendants’ duty of care to 
her as a business invitee.208 The court held that the evidence showed that the defendant 
"had acceptable standards and best practices in place at the time of plaintiff's rape,"209 
sufficient to support the trial court's judgment against the plaintiff. 
This case also demonstrates the essentiality of testimony that failure to deploy 
helicopter assets effectively would be a failure to employ best practices. 
In McCoy v. Hatmaker,210 the Maryland intermediate court affirmed summary 
judgment for a municipality. A victim's estate sued for wrongful death, premised on the 
failure of paramedics to use CPR after the victim was stricken by an apparent heart 
attack. The evidence showed a delay in the arrival of an ambulance because of 
confusion related to the exact location of the victim's vehicle, and that the paramedic 
concluded that the victim was already dead and thus that resuscitation efforts were 
inappropriate.211 The court found that the plaintiff had failed to establish the wanton 
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and reckless disregard conduct necessary to overcome the qualified immunity granted 
public safety personnel by a state statute."212 
Negligence law does not hold anyone liable for failing to do the impossible. The cost of 
helicopter support is a factor that gets figured into the negligence calculus. But it gets 
figured in, not in terms of the most expensive way to provide helicopter support, but in 
terms of as reasonable way is to provide it, as through less expensive helicopters 
available on a shared basis. 
2. Immunity 
Common-law or statutory immunity for governmental entities reduces liability 
exposure, and public safety agencies may insure against liability. The caselaw on 
governmental liability, analyzed in § VI.B, explores the role of qualified immunity 
under federal and state law. Federal immunity and insurance coverage may be 
available for assisting personnel--"second responders"--under the Federal Volunteer 
Protection Act.213 The statute exempts from its liability operation of an aircraft,214 but it 
limits the exclusion for aircraft to those "for which the State requires the operator or the 
owner of the vehicle, craft, or vessel to-- 
“(A) possess an operator's license; or 
“(B) maintain insurance."215 
States are preempted from imposing such requirements by the Federal Aviation Act. 
It preconditions the immunity on proper state licensing, certification, and authorization 
of the volunteer activities.216 It limits the immunity to volunteers of 501(c)(3) 
                                                 
212   763 A.2d at 1244. 
213  Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 111 Stat. 218; 42 U.S.C. § 14501; see Carol A. Rolf, Protecting the 
Protectors: Liability,  Insurance, and Laws Pertaining to Volunteers  Involved in Homeland Security and 
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organizations.217 It preempts state law except to the extent it extends the immunity for 
volunteers, but allows states to opt out of the immunity if they do so explicitly.218  
3. Insurance 
Two concerns about insurance confront sharing operators, including Air-One. First, will 
Air-One or a requesting agency have uninsured liability exposure because of the joint 
nature of the missions? Second, will the use of safety pilots or pilots-in-training as 
described in § VI.C.1 jeopardize insurance coverage? The answer to both questions is 
“no.” 
Any insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the insured which obligates 
the insurer to pay the insured if certain events occur. Insurance policies are aleatory 
contracts.219 Any conceivable insurance policy limits the risks that it covers. For example, 
a policy might provide liability220 and hull221 coverage for mishaps that occur during 
search and rescue missions, while excluding mishaps that occur during personnel 
insertion or extraction even if they are incident to a rescue. Similarly, a policy might 
include mishaps that occur during operations within a certain geographic area, and 
exclude mishaps that occur during operations outside the area. Other limitations, 
particularly relevant in the helicopter-sharing context, might cover a specific helicopter 
only when it is being flown on missions for the agency to which it is registered and not 
when it is being flown on missions for other agencies.  
These are not direct limitations on helicopter operations; they do not obligate the 
insured to use the helicopter in any particular way. Rather, they leave the helicopter 
operator exposed financially to potential liability when it operates outside the coverage 
limits of the policy. 
The aviation insurance market right now is very competitive as to price and other 
policy terms. It is easier for a new operator or a long-term operator entering a new 
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219  In re Texas Ass'n of School Boards, Inc., 169 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2005) (contract in which promise is 
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market segment to get insurance coverage at a reasonable price. Then if the operator 
proves that it has a safe operation, the insurer will renew the policy without insisting on 
whatever restrictions it imposes on new customers after the market has become tighter. 
Insurers are hungry for business and therefore more willing to accommodate the plans 
of potential customers.222 
A typical policy has a limitations-on-use section early in the policy language.223 This 
section typically excludes coverage for certain operations and usually limits use of the 
covered aircraft to named pilots and other pilots within the scope of an Open Pilots 
Warranty (“OPW”).224 
A limitations-on-use section might exclude flight training, or it might exclude law-
enforcement support missions. Or, it might limit law-enforcement support to support of 
particular agencies. It certainly is not feasible to add a requesting agency as a named 
insured after a request for support is received. On the other hand, a straightforward 
solution is within reach: an operator like Air-One can make certain that the named 
insureds cover all public safety agencies within the relevant territory. Air-One itself, for 
example could include all public safety agencies in northern Illinois and southern 
Wisconsin. There is no reason to suppose that this would cause a material increase in 
premium; the risk of a mishap is the same, and the damages and injuries likely to result 
from a mishap are the same.225 
Most aviation insurance policies also limit coverage to flights commanded by named 
pilots226 and other pilots meeting the requirements of an “Open Pilots Waiver” 
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(“OPW”). In Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Gormley,227 for example the district court 
granted declaratory judgment to a helicopter insurer. It held that the insurer was not 
liable under the policy because the pilot in command was not a named pilot in the 
policy and did not meet the requirements of the Open Pilot Warranty.228 
Two interpretations of pilot limitations are of interest in public-safety support 
helicopter operations. One favors the insured. In some states, coverage extends beyond 
flights flown by named pilots and those meeting OPW requirements, unless the insurer 
can prove that the unqualified pilot caused the loss. In AIG Aviation, Inc. v. Holt 
Helicopters, Inc.,229 the court refused to enforce the limitations of an open pilot warranty 
in the absence of proof that the pilot's lack of experience meeting the requirements of 
the warranty was the cause of the accident.230 
The other is a trap that favors the insurer: the language of the policy, as in Gormley, may 
exclude coverage when anyone but a named insured or someone meeting the OPW 
requirements "manipulates the controls" or “operates” the aircraft.231 There's no reason 
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• Total time last 12 months 
Estimated helicopter time next 12 months. Global Aerospace, Application for Helicopter Hull and 
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227  77 F.Supp.2d 705 (D. Md. 1999). 
228  Gormley, 77 F. Supp.2d at 707 (quoting OPW; pilot of helicopter, killed in crash had total time of only 
250 hours in helicopters). 
229  198 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). 
230 The Open Pilot Warranty said: 
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pilot who is either named on the policy or one who meets the Open Pilot Warranty." Insurance Facts and 
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http://www.avioninsurance.com/faq.php#600 (asserting that named pilots is the preferred approach, 
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that an insurer should want such language; the only thing a rational insurer cares about 
is whether the PIC is qualified.232 If, on the other hand, the language limits coverage to 
qualified pilots serving as “pilot in command,” coverage would exist even if the pilot in 
command lets his unrated nephew fly straight-and-level and make gentle turns. If the 
language is “manipulates the controls,” it would not. 
Close attention to such policy language is necessary for any helicopter operation that 
establishes a pilot recruiting pipeline such as the one proposed in § VI.C.2.c) 
The turbine-time requirement is likely to be the most significant barrier, at § VI.C.1 
explains. The most effective way for an operation like Air-One to deal with its insurance 
concerns regarding pilot coverage is to recruit a limited number of well-qualified pilots 
who do not meet the turbine-time criterion and to list them on the policy as named 
pilots. The insurance carrier will reevaluate his underwriting decisions according to the 
detailed data submitted by the named pilot. The operator can expect a premium 
increase, but it may not be as great as anticipated, and the operator will not be 
confronted with the uncertainty of whether its coverage is valid. 
Insurers are likely to have a benign attitude toward such an approach. First of all, 
requiring significant turbine time for helicopters makes little sense. Helicopter RPM is 
stabilized so, unlike with fixed-wing turbine aircraft, there is no significant engine 
spool-up time to be concerned about. It is a requirement that mindlessly got carried 
over from fixed wing insurance practices. 233 
“There is no reason that any insurer in its right mind would oppose letting a low-time 
guy fly in the left seat and log the time, whether as a safety pilot or second-in-command 
or a student. Having any kind of pilot there is always better than having an empty seat. 
At the very least, the left-seat guy can work the radios and perform other non-flying 
duties, thus reducing the load on the PIC. 
“No one would increase the rates for this or deny coverage. Everyone in the industry 
knows this is how people build turbine time. The only issue would be if the left-seat 
                                                                                                                                                             
explaining that open pilot warranty covers pilots meeting certain defined requirements, and observing 
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guy is paying for dual instruction; that puts the operation in a different underwriting 
category. If he's not paying for it, and if it's even arguably mission related, there should 
be no impact on coverage or premiums.” 234 
Fixed criteria as to the qualifications of named pilots do not exist. Commercial policies 
involve enough money that there are actual negotiations over the terms of the policy. It 
is less likely that an insurer will refuse coverage that that it would increase the 
premium if the insured wants more flexibility. "I could be a named pilot for a Huey 
even though I don't have a helicopter rating, but the premium would be 
astronomical."235 
C. Labor markets: Establishing a pipeline for qualified personnel  
Any helicopter operation depends on an adequate supply of skilled personnel, 
especially pilots and mechanics. Attention to the labor supply is particularly critical for 
a volunteer enterprise: what incentives exist for volunteers, despite the absence of 
compensation? 
1. Engines and limits of volunteerism 
Volunteerism has its limits. Volunteer fire departments are struggling all over the 
United States as lifestyles and work patterns change. When most people worked on 
farms or in small shops and businesses near where they lived, it was not difficult for a 
volunteer firefighter to put down his work to respond to a fire. Now, is more likely that 
one’s job is remote from residential communities, increasing the distance to be traveled 
to respond. Moreover, employers are less likely to have a stake in ensuring emergency 
services in communities other than where they operate, and therefore are less likely to 
tolerate a sudden request for time off to go fight a fire.236 
Any helicopter support that does not keep helicopters in the air and pilots until close on 
duty proximate to the helicopter a significant part of the time can provide only limited 
assistance to the patrol function and for incidents such as robberies, muggings, or 
shootings that emerge during patrol or as a result of 911 calls. It simply takes too long to 
round up a crew and get the helicopter to the scene. On the other hand, a volunteer 
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operation has no significant limitations for assisting in barricade situations for law 
enforcement, search and rescue, and disaster relief. A degree of planning is inherent in 
such missions. The volunteer organization can train alongside other public safety 
personnel, participate in their planning, and coordinate deployment. Thirty-minutes or 
so to launch the helicopter makes little difference. 
2. Pilots 
As the availability of Vietnam era military-trained helicopter pilots diminishes, an 
organization like Air-One can reinforce its pipeline a pile of volunteers by taking 
advantage of certain plateaus in the career pathways for civilian helicopter pilots. 
As the following subsections explain, the solution lies in maintaining high standards for 
PICs, while developing a pipeline for less experienced pilots to gain experience and 
training necessary to meet the PIC requirements. 
a) Requirements 
High standards for pilot qualifications are important for the demanding missions of 
public safety helicopter support. Many public safety support missions take place at 
night in rural areas where ground lighting is scarce. One cannot count on moonlight. 
Flight conditions in such circumstances are largely indistinguishable from instrument 
meteorological conditions ("IMC").237 Moreover, effective utilization of helicopter 
capabilities require flying low and slow—flight regimes in which the skill level to effect 
a successful autorotation landing in the event of an engine failure are high. Sworn 
peace-officer status is necessary for pilots to be able to participate in classified anti-
terrorism briefings. 
At the same time, high standards diminish the supply of potential volunteer pilots. 
Setting and maintaining stringent standards for pilots in command, however, is not 
inconsistent with providing training and development opportunities for less 
experienced pilots to keep the pipeline a potential pilot volunteers flowing. 
Air-One publishes two requirements for its volunteer pilots: 
1. professional first-responders  
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2. minimum of 1,500 hours as PIC in rotorcraft and 250 hours as PIC in turbine 
powered rotorcraft, a Commercial rotorcraft certificate with Instrument-
rotorcraft rating.238 
Pilot recruitment poses somewhat different problems from recruitment of TFOs and 
other personnel. As the minimum number of hours increases, the pool of available 
pilots shrinks rapidly. 
The pool of helicopter pilots with this level of experience who are sworn law-
enforcement officers is even smaller. Accordingly, a program of pilot recruitment that 
does not dilute the standards for pilots-in-command, while opening up the field for 
more candidates is desirable. 
Practices and philosophies about personnel vary widely, especially in the law-
enforcement community, on the question of whether it's easier to "make a cop out of a 
pilot,” or make a “pilot out of a cop."  
The LAPD, for example, prefers to make pilots out of cops. So does the Fontana police 
Department. LAPD requires at least five years experience as a ground patrol officer, a 
private rating in either airplanes or helicopters, and 100 hours flight time before 
selection as a pilot. Once an officer is selected as a pilot, however, the department pays 
for his commercial flight training, and indeed conduct ground school and certain parts 
of his flight training. 
The Maryland State police, in contrast, regularly advertises for civilian pilots. In 2010, 
most of its helicopter pilots were civilians.239 
b) Career pathways 
An organization like Air-One can benefit from a plateau that exists in the career 
development for professional helicopter pilots. It could offer well-trained but less 
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experienced pilots the opportunity to build turbine time by volunteering to fly in the 
left seat of Air-One helicopters.240 
The goal of an aspiring helicopter pilot, typically, is to qualify for a flying job that pays 
$80,000 to $100,000 annually. Such salaries are available in jobs comparable to public 
safety support – emergency medical services and industrial operations such as 
transmission line patrols and oil and gas exploration. Such positions typically require 
2,000 to 3,000 hours total time, and 1,000 hours turbine time.241 
First, the pilot must obtain a rotorcraft rating. This requires total flight time of 40 
hours242-- usually it takes 45 to 65 hours—of flight instruction and solo time. The result 
is a private pilot certificate. Then, the pilot must obtain a commercial rating, which 
requires total flight time of 150 hours.243 These two steps are obtainable for civilians only 
by paying for a professional pilot training program.244 The cost is comparable to that of 
a college education. The most popular primary helicopter trainer, a Robinson R22, costs 
on the order of $300 per hour for dual time and $250 for solo time.245 So the aspiring 
pilot must have the means to pay $75,000 or more for flight training.246 
During this phase, the pilot also would obtain an instrument rating, which requires 
another 40 hours of dual instruction,247 some of which may be concurrent with the 
                                                 
240 Most helicopters are flown from the right seat, although some are flown from the left seat. The 
discussion that follows assumes that the pilot in command is in the right seat and that the left seat is is the 
copilot position in the cockpit. 
241 See http://www.justhelicopters.com/tabid/255/category/1/Default.aspx [viewed 28 Nov 2013] (Air 
Medical Resource Group EC135 pilot requirements: 3,000 total, 1,000 turbine; MedTrans Bell 207 pilot 
requirements: 2,000 total, 1,000 turbine; PSEG electrical line patrol pilot requirements: 2,000 total, 1,000 
turbine). 
242  14 C.F.R. § 61.109(a) (setting aeronautical experience requirements). 
243  14 C.F.R. § 61.129 (setting aeronautical experience requirements for commercial rating). 
244 Unless the aspiring pilot owns his own helicopter, which is unlikely. 
245 See http://www.hillsboroaviation.com/en/page/helicopter_flight_training_rates_and_fees; 
http://www.midwesternhelicopter.com/rates.htm (quoting $230 per hour for R22 solo time and $40 per 
hour for instructor); http://www.flymidwest.com/details.aspx?NavID=124 (quoting $295 per hour for 
dual instruction in R22); http://www.corporatehelicopters.com/staticpages/index.php?page=helicopter-
instruction-rates (quoting $245 her hour for solo time and $275 per hour for dual instruction). 
246 See Helicopter Academy, http://www.helicopteracademy.com/ (quoting $75,125 for commercial rating 
and additional $5,000 for CFI rating). Loans are available to finance the costs. See 
http://www.hillsboroaviation.com/en/page/helicopter_flight_training_financing. 
247  14 C.F.R. § 61.65 (specifying aeronautical experience for instrument rating). 
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requirements for the commercial rating. Now, the pilot has some 200 hours, all of it 
likely in piston-driven helicopters. From this point forward, the pilot can begin earning 
modest compensation for flying – maybe $25-$35,000 per year at first. His immediate 
goal is to build total time. 
The opportunities at this stage for turbine helicopter jobs are few and far between, so 
most pilots get their certified flight instructor ("CFI") rating248 and build time giving 
flight instruction, or fly rides and tours in piston driven helicopters, or a combination of 
the two. A flight instructor at a reasonably busy flight school can expect to fly 70-80 
hours per month and acquire a thousand hours total time after a year to a year-and-a-
half.  
Then, the focus has to shift to building turbine time. This can be obtained mainly by 
flying with larger tour operators that fly turbine helicopters.249 Once the pilot has, say 
500 turbine hours and 1,500 to 2,000 total hours, jobs in other, more demanding, sectors 
become available, such as executive charter, ENG, 250 EMS, and industrial applications 
such as powerline and pipeline patrols and oil and gas drilling. 
c) Safety pilots as recruitment pipeline 
One possibility under discussion by Air-One’s leadership is to establish a new position 
of “safety pilot,"–essentially a copilot, although none of Air-One’s helicopters require 
two pilot operation. Helicopter pilots with several hundred hours and a commercial 
rating would qualify. They would be trained as TFOs and then allowed to build time in 
the public safety helicopters as copilots or safety pilots, building turbine hours while 
undergoing further Air-One tactical training.  
                                                 
248 No additional flight time is required for a CFI rating, but a written and flight test are. 14 CFR § 61.183. 
249 See http://www.sundancehelicopters.com/about-us/employment/ (requiring 1,000 total hours). 
Sundance flies AS350 and EC130 helicopters, both turbine powered. 
http://www.sundancehelicopters.com/. See also http://www.temscoair.com/pilots.php (requiring 1,000 
total hours; no turbine requirement). Temsco flies Hughes 500Ds and AS350s, both turbine powered. 
http://www.temscoair.com/aircraft.php. Once a pilot proves himself for a season flying rides and tours, 
Temsco offers him the opportunity to move to industrial assignments such as long line operations. 
250 See http://www.justhelicopters.com/tabid/255/category/1/Default.aspx [viewed 28 Nov 2013] 
(Helicopters Inc. ENG full-time and part-time pilot requirements: 1500 total and 250 turbine). 
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Once a safety pilot is selected, he she would be sworn in as a reserve deputy sheriff. 
Police academy training would ensue in due course, interleaved with tactical Air-One 
training, qualifying the pilot to be a sworn peace officer. 
After a safety pilot completes an internal check ride, he or she would be available to fly 
ferry and demonstration missions in VFR conditions–relieving the fully qualified Air-
One pilots from those missions. This approach has precedent. The Maryland State 
Police, for example, recruits civilian SIC pilots with a minimum requirement of 1200 
helicopter hours, without a specific turbine time requirement.251 
Even though Air-One is not subject to Part 135 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, 
applicable to commercial operators such as air charter and air taxi operators in the 
private sector, the Part 135 requirements for pilot training252 would be a useful template 
for the details of Air-One’s safety pilot program.  
As § VI.B.3 explains, insurance limitations are not likely to be a barrier: a trained pilot in 
the left seat is better than a non-pilot. 
In this scenario, Air-One would recruit helicopter pilots who have their commercial 
ratings, and who may be working as flight instructors, to volunteer for Air-One. In 
exchange for their time and undergoing training for flight duties and public safety 
responsibilities, pilots would have the opportunity to build turbine time without having 
to pay for it. 
d) Reservations about civilian pilots 
Some public-safety agencies deal with the pilot shortage problem and their preference 
for all aircrew members to have law enforcement experience by accepting relatively 
low-time pilots. Captain Faulkner, in Fontana, for example, is open to low time pilots. 
One TFO in December 2013 has a private helicopter rating that he earned on his own 
after be became a TFO. Now he has received Police Department support to work 
toward his commercial rating. He was about ready to take flight test at the time of the 
                                                 
251  http://www.jsfirm.com/job/Pilot-
Rotary+Wing+Maryland+State+Police+Civilian+Helicopter+Pilot+I,+Second-In-
Command+(2271)/Middle+River-Maryland/jobID_64512 [visited 28 November 2013]. 
252   14 C.F.R. §§ 135.291-135.301 (crewmember testing requirements); 14 C.F.R. §§ 135.321-135.351 
(imposing training requirements, and defining qualifications for check pilots). 
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visit. Another, younger, TFO working toward his private helicopter rating, has had a 
total of 25 hours. 
Substantial experience as a street officer is necessary, in Faulkner’s opinion, for TFOs 
and pilots. Four reasons exist:  
First, only an experienced police officer can function effectively in an airborne patrol 
car. Only he can relate to the needs of the ground officers the helicopter is supporting 
and understand how to fly the mission to be most effective.  
Second and at least as important, is the traditionally proud and insular law enforcement 
culture. "You put a kid in the cockpit who has had no experience or only a year or two 
of experience as the street officer, then you invite derision: ‘pretty boys aviators.'" 
Third, experience shows that some low-time civilian pilots without law enforcement 
experience demonstrate a lack of concern for police work. Despite his conviction that 
low-time pilots can do the job, Faulkner’s experience convinces him that a model that 
recruits low-time civilian pilots cannot work. "It's well understood that what they really 
want–all they want—is to build flight time toward the magic thousand hours. We tried 
it once or twice, and found that such pilots were so eager to fly that they were willing to 
make safety compromises with the weather. When they got up, they could fly the flight 
profile requested by the TFO competently, but they were zoned out. They simply 
weren't interested in law enforcement; they were interested only in flying.” 
Finally, pilots without ground experience may lack peer respect necessary to integrate 
ground and air-support operations. It wouldn't do any good, Faulkner’s opinion, to 
recruit low-time civilian pilots and send them to the police academy, because this 
would not earn the respect of the rank-and-file ground officers. Only street time earns 
that. "You have to earn it”, is the mantra. 
3. Tactical Flight Officers 
More than pilots, TFOs must have intimate familiarity with the missions to be 
supported. Experience and training as a law-enforcement officer, an emergency medical 
technician, or a firefighter is essential for this job classification. Almost everyone agrees 
that relevant experience as a street cop, followed up by intensive TFO training is 
necessary for the aircrew member who is going to be most involved in coordinating 
with ground personnel and then suggesting appropriate flight profiles to the pilot. 
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Active-duty public safety personnel are ideal because that opens up the possibility of 
resource sharing by their employing agencies making them available to fly helicopter 
missions. 
The supply of such personnel is ample because the qualifications they need are those of 
the requirements of their pre--helicopter jobs. Usually the novelty and excitement of 
flying helicopter support operations represents an adequate incentive for them to 
volunteer. If they are not assigned as a part of the regular duties, of course, the usual 
calculus as to whether someone wants to volunteer for any activity applies—weighing 
the excitement and novelty against family and educational obligations and other 
alternatives for spending leisure time. 
4. Recruiting mechanics  
Volunteer mechanics are desirable for the same reasons that volunteers are desirable to 
fill other positions. But mechanics do not have the same incentive to volunteer that 
pilots do, because pilots need to earn flight time to qualify for employment. If they 
cannot do it in paid positions, many are willing to do it by volunteering. 
Mechanics, like those in any other skilled profession or trade, enhance their career 
prospects by gaining experience, but opportunities for mechanics to gain paid 
experience in entry-level positions abound. 
One possibility is to explore with A&P mechanic schools253 the possibility of internships, 
so that A&P students during the last part of their training would be placed in public 
safety helicopter support and work under the supervision of more senior already-
qualified A&T mechanics.254 
That would have the effect of extending the mechanic manpower available on a 
volunteer basis. 
                                                 
253 See e.g. http://www.swic.edu/aviation-maintenance-technology/ (one-year program in southern 
Illinois); http://www.redstone.edu/about/whyredstone.asp (one-year program in Denver area). Neither 
program presently advertises an intern program. 
254  See Terry Palmer, High-Tech Economy Drives Demand for Technicians, Rotor, Fall 2013 at 22, 24 
(urging helicopter operators to develop relationships with A&P students, including internships). 
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D. Leadership and marketing 
Charismatic, resourceful leadership makes all the difference between success and 
failure. Faulkner is an example of the kind of leadership necessary when air support 
operations are first established.255 Dan Bitton and the rest of the Air One leadership are 
others. Burdette is an example of leadership necessary to keep it going and to grow it. 
The job goes far beyond buying helicopters, recruiting personnel, and supervising them. 
Effective marketing and promotion to the right constituents is essential. 
The most important constituency is the ground force to be supported by helicopters. 
The helicopter support operator must anticipate a natural reaction of an officer on the 
street: "You're going to steal my call." The operator must demonstrate—not just 
promise--that the first unit responding still remains in charge, while helicopter support 
functions as a special kind of backup. 
Marketing is part of it. As with any marketing, it must begin with an identification of a 
unmet need and a matching of the actual capabilities of the helicopter operator with the 
need; if an operator is not capable, financially or in terms of human resources, to fly 
airborne patrol to support law-enforcement, it should focus on what else it can do to be 
helpful. Doing those things well will build support as it builds capability to broaden its 
missions, including airborne patrol if that's what it wants. 
Helicopter support operators must resist an approach/avoidance conflict, lamenting the 
fact that too few agencies appreciate what helicopters can do, but being reluctant to 
undertake an aggressive public education and public-safety-training program because 
they fear that it will stimulate requests for support they cannot meet, given their limited 
resources and limited budget. 
The problem, of course, is that public support for more resources, including financial 
resources, depends on the public and the public safety community’s knowing about the 
operation, its capabilities, and wanting more. 
As agencies are developing strengthening their understanding of what helicopter 
support can do, the helicopter support unit should be proactive instead of waiting to be 
called out. For example, when a natural disaster occurs, the helicopter unit should not 
                                                 
255  The main question about the future of the Fontana operation is whether it is well enough established 
to survive Faulkner’s retirement within about a year. 
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only increase its readiness to respond to a call; it should launch over to the site in order 
to offer intelligence, at least, and other types of support that it knows it can provide. 
Effective marketing, however, does not mean seizing the limelight. It is far better if the 
usual ground personnel and their commanders get the credit for successful mission in 
the press and media and then say, "we couldn't of done it without the helicopter 
support," that if the helicopter unit is the first to give a press conference bragging about 
what it did. 
The Fontana, California, Police Department Air Support Unit provides a good example 
of how resourceful leadership sells helicopter support and makes good decisions about 
affordability. It shows how effective public safety helicopter support can start. Its 
history illustrates some of the crucial ingredients: a passionate, charismatic, articulate, 
and resourceful advocate, good sense about cost, benefits, and how to create a win-win 
situation for crucial constituencies, and alignment of political stars. 
Historically, Fontana had received air support from the San Bernardino County 
Sheriff’s Department, which patrolled the whole county.256 The availability of a 
helicopter for the western part of the county where Fontana is located was sporadic, 
because of a shortage of aircrews. Faulkner, a sergeant at the time, persuaded Fontana 
and several surrounding municipalities offered to observers in exchange for the 
Sheriff’s department assigning a helicopter to the western part of the county. Each 
agency agreed to participate assigning an observer to fly one day p/week. The Sheriff’s 
department agreed with alacrity. Faulkner was flying R44s as a part-time pilot with the 
El Monte Police Department’s air support unit.  
Because he was familiar with El Monte’s sharing operation, he embarked on a campaign 
to enlist some surrounding municipalities, beginning with the senior officers he already 
knew. His pitch was that Fontana would provide helicopter support in exchange for in-
kind contributions. Rialto contributed hanger space. Colton contributed $16,000 worth 
of gasoline. Redlands promised to fly its fixed-wing airplane over Fontana when the 
Fontana helicopter was not in the air. Everyone contributed at least one body—a pilot 
or TFO. 
                                                 
256 The facts in this section results from a conversation between co-author Perritt and Capt. David 
Faulkner, Fontana Police Department, 20 December, 2013. 
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Faulkner’s mantra from the beginning was that any air support operation must justify 
its existence by the quality of the services it provides to officers on the street. He was 
and remains convinced that the key to any support operation is the quality of the key of 
TFOs. If they are not enthusiastic and resourceful in making their experience as street 
policemen palpable to ground forces, success is impossible. It doesn't matter what kind 
of equipment is available. 
Recruiting an initial team was not a problem. Faulkner had a robust network of pilots 
and TFOs who flew for El Monte.  
Faulkner heard that Robinson was developing a turbine version of the R44, but was not 
yet sure whether it would offer a law-enforcement option. He went to see Kurt 
Robinson. Together they went to the factory floor to see the first R66, as it was being 
assembled. Faulkner turned to Robinson and said, "you're going to sell me that 
helicopter." Robinson protested and said that it was far too early to know who the first 
purchaser would be. "No," Faulkner repeated. "Listen to me. I'm telling you you're 
going to sell me that helicopter." Robinson was interested in having a police department 
to showcase the new model, and they made a deal. 
In the experience of the Fontana unit, the first responding ground unit is perfectly 
happy to have the air support set up the perimeter; that relieves him of a difficult task 
and later criticism for doing it incorrectly. Also, intellectually, everyone understands 
that one can set up a better perimeter from the air than from the ground. 
Marketing morphs into politics. Politics obviously will determine whether funding is 
available at all and, if it is, the functions it is available to support. It is well understood 
in political science that public policy decisions in a democratic society depend, not only 
on numbers in support and opposition, but also on how strongly members of one or the 
other camp feel about an issue and how focused they are. If one side is diffuse and the 
other concentrated, the concentrated side almost always wins.257 
That is a particular problem for mobilizing governmental support for public safety 
helicopter operations. The opposition is concentrated and passionate; supporters are 
diffuse and relatively indifferent. Opponents fall into two roughly defined camps: 
                                                 
257  CITE poli-sci literature. 
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residents of the area – who are concerned about noise and the risk of a crash; and those 
who are concerned about invasions of privacy and are instinctively wary of any 
increase in law-enforcement capability. The second camp is particularly concerned 
about the law-enforcement drone issue.258 
It is not clear that anything can be done to reduce opposition from these two camps, but 
proponents can be proactive to reduce the persuasiveness of their opposing arguments, 
by explaining how tight procedures and intensive training reduce risks of accidents and 
reduces noise pollution over populated areas.259 
On the favorable side, proponents of more robust helicopter support for safety 
operations can make sure that the public discourse over disaster relief, search and 
rescue, and counterterrorism includes accessible and evocative materials on what 
helicopters can do. In this regard, proponents should be opportunistic, press advisories 
supervisors whenever a disaster strikes, an active shooter incident occurs, or someone is 
rescued. Proponents also can be opportunistic with respect to mishaps, such as high-
speed automobile chases and hostage situations that go wrong. 
VII. Funding sources and mechanism 
There is no such thing as a free lunch. Air-One is essentially a volunteer fire 
department, facing the usual challenges of any such volunteer-based operation. The 
Air-One leadership is forced to decline many less critical requests simply because it 
would cost too much to fly them.  
Public or private funding for a full-time operation, staffed by a combination of 
volunteers and paid professionals is unlikely. An operation like Air-One must piece 
together support in cash and in kind from a variety of sources. It may be able to 
supplement this with a steady flow of grants from the federal government, especially if 
it links its training and operations to the Civil Air Patrol. 
The main determinant for the level of funding required is whether the requisite 
capabilities can be sustained with funding only for equipment acquisition and training, 
or whether additional funding is necessary for operations. 
                                                 
258  See § XXX (discussing opposition to drones). 
259  See Means at XXX (emphasizing flight profiles to reduce noise footprints). 
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If funding for operations is necessary, how much depends on whether volunteers are 
available to perform some or all of the necessary functions. An operation requiring paid 
pilots, mechanics, TFOs, GSOs, and  dispatchers obviously is going to have a much 
bigger budget than one in which volunteers are available for some of all of these job 
classifications. Even when operations rely on volunteerism, as in the case of Air-One, 
the CAP, and volunteer fire departments, out-of-pocket expenditures for fuel, oil, and 
maintenance may be necessary. 
Air-One’s Jet Ranger helicopters burn about 40 gallons per hour, and its Huey 
helicopters burn about 85 gallons per hour. Fuel for turbine engines costs $6.77 per 
gallon. That means an out-of-pocket cost starting at $270-$575 for every Air-One 
mission.260 In addition, Air-One incurs, as a variable cost,261 whatever maintenance is 
largely dependent on the number of hours on each helicopter. All operators of 
helicopters for hire262 must perform 100 hour inspections on each helicopter.263 A typical 
100-hour inspection on a Huey helicopter costs XXX. In addition, the age of the 
Helicopters makes parts hard-to-find, increasing maintenance costs further. 
A. Local funding 
No general impediments exist to funding public safety helicopter support organized in 
any of the ways considered in Part V. Funds can be made available to individual 
agencies to provide their own helicopter assets; they can be provided for agencies to 
enter into contractual relationships with commercial operators; they can be provided for 
agencies’ contractual relationships with nonprofit operators, and they can be provided 
directly to non-profits like Air-One. Economies of scale for pilot recruitment and 
assignment, maintenance, and training suggest that helicopters can be utilized more 
efficiently if they are provided for through shared helicopter: support—that is the thesis 
of this article. In other words public-safety agencies would have less budget strain if 
they support Air-One than if they provide helicopter support for themselves. 
                                                 
260  Assuming that the average mission requires three hours of flight time. 
261  A variable cost is one that varies depending on flight time, such as fuel costs. In contrast, fixed costs 
do not vary with flight time: hangar rental, helicopter purchase costs. 
262  Uncertainty exists as to whether Air-One’s operations meet this test. 
263   14 C.F.R. § 91.409(b). 
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Restrictions exist, of course, in particularized appropriation legislation.264 
In theory any one or more of several mechanisms could ensure basic funding to an 
operation like Air-One:  
• Contracts and grants from local public safety agencies at the hundred thousand 
dollar level  
• Grants from state or federal levels of government.  
If contracts are the mechanism chosen, Air-One must be careful to avoid the tendency of 
people entering into long-term contracts for helicopter services to have unrealistic 
expectations about their availability. 
One straightforward way to fund the direct operating costs of Air-One's operation is to 
have the public service agencies reimburse Air-One for its direct operating costs when it 
flies a mission for them. But that system raises concerns about Air-One losing its 
nonprofit status and the reimbursements constituting a commercial relationship that 
would violate the terms under which the helicopters were donated by the government. 
An alternative is to have the agencies that might call on Air-One’s services to make 
periodic grants, under contracts that define Air-One’s obligations in exchange for the 
grants. This also might raise concerns about the nature of the revenues under the grant 
and compliance with the terms under which the helicopters were received from the 
Government.265 
The Department of Homeland Security cannot make operating grants,266 but there is no 
reason it cannot broker agreements between Air-One-like nonprofits and units of state, 
county, or local government wishing to contract for its services. 
More creative funding models employed by some types of public safety support 
organizations are impracticable for an operation like Air-One. Many volunteer fire 
departments solicit subscriptions from area homeowners and businesses, who may 
have an incentive to pay it because of reduced insurance rates. Otherwise they rely on 
                                                 
264  CITE restrictions in Homeland Security appropriation act. 
265  QUOTE and CITE grant restrictions. 
266  CITE 
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donations and fundraisers such as pancake breakfasts and raffles.267 Some EMS 
helicopter operations such as CareFlite and Air Evac substantially supplement their 
revenue streams with memberships – a kind of de facto insurance in which individuals 
in the service area pay relatively small amounts annually--$60 for CareFlite in exchange 
for a commitment to supplement their regular insurance coverage so that they do not 
have to pay any anything for an air evacuation.268 
In both of these instances, it is not difficult to persuade an individual or a small business 
owner that his personal property may be directly at risk. For an operation like Air-One, 
the risk is more diffuse and indirect. It is much harder for an individual contributor to 
perceive that he personally or his business property might need helicopter support 
services in the event of a crime, a lost or distress person, or a natural disaster. 
It might be feasible, however, to employ a subscription model in which the subscribers 
are the local public service agencies. 
There is less resistance, however, to devoting resources to homeland security and 
natural disaster relief. Accordingly, to the extent that helicopter assets can be useful for 
these purposes, it is more likely that support can be obtained for them. Then, a good 
organizational concept will make sure that they could be used for a broader spectrum of 
public safety support. The same infrastructure of human and physical capital that 
supports natural disaster relief and antiterrorism efforts also supports law-enforcement 
and search-and- rescue missions. 
As section VII.B suggests, the CAP funding model provides an interesting alternative 
for support. 
                                                 
267  See Wayne L. Eder,How to Form a Volunteer Fire Department (Oct. 29, 2009), 
http://voices.yahoo.com/how-form-volunteer-fire-department-4753572.html (also reviewing training 
requirements and acquisition of surplus vehicles and other equipment). See also 
http://www.fema.gov/welcome-assistance-firefighters-grant-program (summarizing FEMA grants 
available for training and equipment acquisition). 
268 Swartz interview. 
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B. Federal funding: the Civil Air Patrol 
The Civil Air Patrol (“CAP”) is a nationwide organization, defined as the "U.S. Air 
Force auxiliary."269 It uses volunteer pilots organized through a military hierarchy 
imitating that of the Air Force itself. It owns some of its own airplanes, but many 
volunteer pilot-members fly CAP missions in their own aircraft. An important part of 
its mission is recruiting young people into aviation careers and activities through its CA 
P cadet program. 
The CAP is not an alternative to the Air-One model, because does not fly helicopters, 
and its mission is limited to search and rescue – mostly for downed aircraft. The 
authorizing statute says XXX. 
But, the CAP is the Air-One model, writ large. 
Most interesting for purposes of this article is the magnitude and breadth of financial 
support the CAP receives from the federal government. The CAP receives funding and 
a general kind of oversight from Air Force headquarters. The Air Force is authorized to 
provide aircraft and other equipment, to detail personnel, to pay travel expenses, and to 
pay staff at the CAP national headquarters.270 It may use federal agency resources to 
"provide assistance requested by State or local governmental authorities to perform 
disaster relief missions and activities, other emergency missions and activities, and 
nonemergency missions and activities."271  
Its members are entitled to federal workers compensation,272 and the Air Force pays for 
liability insurance.273 
                                                 
269  10 U.S.C. § 9441 (defining CAP as a federally chartered nonprofit corporation, not an instrumentality 
of the federal government). But see 10 U.S.C. § 9442(b)(2) (making CAP an instrumentality of the United 
States when carrying out mission assigned by Secretary of the Air Force). 
270   10 U.S.C. § 944 (b) (enumerating types of support authorized). The Secretary of the Air Force must 
prescribe regulations for administration of the CAP. 10 U.S.C. § 9448. 
271   10 U.S.C. § 9443(a) (authorizing CAP to use federal agency resources, including aircraft, motor 
vehicle, computers, and communications equipment for purposes quoted in text). 
272   5 U.S.C. § 8141 (authorizing federal workers compensation benefits to volunteer civilian members of 
the CAP). 




According to its 2012 Annual Report,274 in Fiscal year 2012, the CAP had 34,000 adult 
members and 26,000 cadets.275 It flew 703 search and rescue missions with 382 finds and 
32 lives saved, 191 counterdrug missions and 719 other state support missions. Most of 
its flight hours, however, were for orientation of CAP cadets and ROTC cadets.276 It 
received $1.9 million in state funding and $27.8 million in federal operations and 
maintenance funding.277 
A 2012 GAO report on the CAP, required by Congress,278 urged greater use in 
Homeland Security missions.279 It noted, however, that the Posse Comitatus Act may 
prevent deeper CAP involvement in law-enforcement support missions.280  
"In providing support to civilian law enforcement agencies, CAP is precluded from 
participating in the interdiction of vehicles, vessels, or aircraft, or in search, seizure, 
arrest, apprehension, surveillance, pursuit, or similar activity. CAP is also unable to 
transport prisoners, contraband, and law enforcement officers in direct support of an 
ongoing mission, or when hostilities are imminent. CBP officials told us that because of 
these restrictions, CAP is unable to provide the type of support that is necessary for 
some law enforcement activities."281  
Department of Defense regulations implementing the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits 
DoD personnel from: 
"Evidence collection; security functions; crowd and traffic control; and operating, 
manning, or staffing checkpoints . . . ."282 or from 
                                                 
274  http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/16874web1_689D49FCE91EF.pdf. 
275  CAP 2012 Report Statistical Overview. 
276  GAO Report at 10. 
277  CAP 2012 Annual Report Statistical Summary. 
278  See 155 Cong. Rec. H5428-01 (May 12, 2009) (Congressional debate and support for legislation 
requiring the GAO study). 
279  Civil Air Patrol Homeland Security Missions (2012) (GAO 13-56). The Coast Guard, 
in particular, expressed skepticism about the CAP's capability to assume an expanded 
role.  
280  Id. at 14. 
281  Id. at 15. 
282   32 C.F.R. § 182.6(a)(1)(iii)(A)(5). 
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"Surveillance or pursuit of individuals, vehicles, items, transactions, or physical 
locations . . . ."283 
It excepts "A member of the Civil Air Patrol, except when performing missions 
pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 9442(b)."284 
The most serious CAP deficiency was not mentioned in the GAO report: the fact that it 
flies no helicopters. The CAP used to employ helicopters, but not since 1988.285 
The Congress could provide additional support and resolve the liability question by 
enacting a new statute treating Air-One-like organizations like the CAP, but under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security. Or, it could amend the CAP 
statutes to encompass Air-One like organizations. Or it could authorize Air-One 
activities as activities of the CAP. 
The disadvantage of this approach would be that it almost certainly would reduce 
likely flexibility to mold organization and operations to the differing needs of different 
regions of the country. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Unless the public safety community, particularly the law-enforcement community, 
becomes more open-minded and willing to share assets and to use lower-cost 
helicopters, it is likely to find expensive turbine helicopters dedicated to patrol missions 
gradually replaced by inexpensive drones. Helicopter support for search-and- rescue, 
SWAT team operations, and disaster relief, on the other hand, will continue to require 
larger helicopters. 
 
                                                 
283   32 C.F.R. § 182.6(a)(1)(iii)(A)(6). 
284   32 C.F.R. § 182.6(a)(2)(v) 
285  See http://captalk.net/index.php?topic=6167.0 (blog) (discussing no-helicopter policy and reasons for 
it). 
